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Administrative Federalism as 
Separation of Powers 
David S. Rubenstein 
Abstract 
Federal agencies are key players in our federalist system: they 
make front-line decisions about the scope of federal policy and 
whether such policy should preempt state law. How agencies 
perform these functions, and how they might fulfill them better, 
are questions at the heart of “administrative federalism.” Some 
academic proposals for administrative federalism work to enhance 
states’ ability to participate in federal agency decisionmaking. 
Other proposals work to protect state autonomy through 
adjustments to the Supreme Court’s administrative preemption 
doctrine. As jurists and scholars debate what these proposals 
entail for federalism, this Article doubles-down with a twist: it 
examines what these same proposals can do for separation of 
powers.  
As uncovered here, adjustments to the administrative 
system—although made in federalism’s name—will derivatively 
affect how national law is made and checked along the 
separation-of-powers dimension. Moreover, as shown here, 
federalism-inspired proposals for the administrative system may 
require a tradeoff in constitutional values. Pushed to decide, we 
might choose federalism over separation of powers, or vice versa. 
This Article informs that choice by comparing and contrasting 
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what administrative federalism’s major proposals entail for 
federalism and separation of powers, simultaneously.  
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I. Introduction 
This Article plies the cross-dimensional channels between 
federalism and separation of powers.1 More specifically, it 
provides the inaugural study of what a particularly salient brand 
of federalism—“administrative federalism”2—can do for a long-
tortured separation of powers around the administrative state.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part II.D (situating this Article within an emerging 
scholarship on cross-dimensional structuralism).  
 2. See infra Parts II & III (discussing administrative federalism); see also 
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: 
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2132–37 
(2008) (describing the “surprising amount of interest” devoted to administrative 
federalism); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–10 nn.26–28 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Agency Reform] 
(noting that administrative preemption has taken center stage in preemption 
debates). 
 3. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (claiming that the administrative state “has deranged our three-
branch legal theories”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 
462 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (“From the birth of 
the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory 
government as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.”).  
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Administrative federalism is partly a descriptive term for the 
role that agencies play in shaping the federal–state balance of 
power today. More so, however, administrative federalism is a 
visionary project designed to shape federalism’s future through 
adjustments to the existing administrative system. Increasingly, 
agencies make front-line decisions about the scope of federal policy 
and whether such policy should preempt state law. But, at the 
heart of administrative federalism’s prescriptive agenda are 
questions about how agencies might better fulfill these functions in 
pursuit of one, or some other, federalist ideal.4 
Some academic proposals for administrative federalism aim to 
enhance states’ participatory role in administrative processes; for 
instance, by requiring agencies to consult state officials before 
taking action that might implicate state prerogatives.5 Other 
proposals work to protect state autonomy through adjustments to 
the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine; for instance, by limiting 
it or making it more difficult for agencies to preempt competing 
state law.6 As jurists and scholars debate what these and other 
proposals entail for federalism, this Article doubles-down with a 
twist: it examines what these same proposals entail for the federal 
separation of powers.  
Although administrative federalism may be a surprising 
source of separation-of-powers innovation, the administrative 
system is hardly in a position to reject the bid. It is common fare 
that agencies distort our three-branch model of federal 
government.7 Despite the Constitution’s vesting of “all” legislative 
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra Part II.C (canvassing a number of different conceptions of 
federalism).  
 5. See infra Part III.B and IV.B (discussing and evaluating these 
proposals). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A (discussing and evaluating these proposals).  
 7. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against 
Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997); Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19–26 (2001); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Justification]; 
Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside 
the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 463 (2012). 
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power in Congress,8 the Executive Branch (through agencies) 
makes the vast majority of federal law today.9 Moreover, many 
agencies combine lawmaking, executive, and judicial functions—a 
combination that James Madison decried as the “very definition of 
tyranny”10 and that arguably violates Articles I, II, and III of the 
Constitution simultaneously.11 The result is an enormously 
powerful, yet constitutionally insecure, administrative machine.12 
Although these are familiar points in administrative law,13 they 
remain mostly inchoate in debates over administrative federalism.  
                                                                                                     
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 9. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “the sheer amount of law” made by agencies has “far outnumbered 
the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process” for 
some time).  
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 11. See Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2010) 
(suggesting that combination in agencies of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial power “has long been an embarrassment for constitutional law”); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1232 (1994) (providing an originalist treatment of this claim). 
 12. On the sheer size of the administrative bureaucracy, relative to 
Congress, see Eric A. Posner, Imbalance of Power, Feb. 7, 2014, 
http://ericposner.com/imbalance-of-power/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (showing 
that over time “the ratio of federal (civilian, non-post office) employees to 
legislative employees (Congress and its staff)” has increased from approximately 
10:1 in the early years of the New Deal to nearly 44:1 in 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). And the leviathan is growing. See City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting 
that “in the last 15 years, Congress has launched more than 50 new 
agencies. . . . And more are on the way” (internal citations omitted)). 
 13. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11, at 1231 (“The post-New Deal 
administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system 
amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”); see also 
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the 
uneasy fit of the modern administrative state in our constitutional structure); 
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 526 (1989) [hereinafter Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation] (exploring the issues raised by reallocating regulatory 
powers). 
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As developed here, however, variations in how agencies decide 
the reach and preemptive effect of federal policies (along the 
federalism dimension) can indirectly influence how national law is 
made and checked by the federal branches (along the separation-
of-powers dimension). Take, for example, the administrative 
federalism proposal that would require agencies to use notice-and-
comment procedures before preempting state law.14 This proposal’s 
intended federalism effects are to afford states a participatory role 
in agencies’ preemption decisions and, relatedly, to slow the pace of 
those decisions. As will be shown, however, this same proposal 
indirectly triggers heightened political and judicial checks on 
agency action, which are key features of modern separation-of-
powers theory.15 Still, might a competing administrative 
federalism proposal—such as eliminating agencies’ ability to 
preempt state law—promote separation of powers differently, or 
better, by requiring Congress to make (rather than delegate) more 
decisions of national concern?  
This type of comparative analysis presents an opportunity: 
appreciation for how administrative federalism affects separation 
of powers opens new lines of thinking about which proposals, 
relative to others, can best promote one, or some other, version of 
separation of powers. That is, without denying federalism its due, 
we should consider ways to harness administrative federalism in 
service of our whole structural system.  
Indeed, administrative federalism may be an especially 
profitable resource for promoting separation of powers. First, 
administrative federalism has captured the attention of the 
Court,16 President,17 Congress,18 and academy.19 To the extent this 
                                                                                                     
 14. For further discussion of this proposal, see infra Part IV.A.3. 
 15. See infra Part B (discussing the evolution of separation of powers 
theory as relates to administrative governance). 
 16. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 
38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 278–82 (2015) [hereinafter Rubenstein, 
Paradox] (discussing some of the Court’s recent treatments of administrative 
preemption), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23
79627. 
 17. See Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 384 
(May 20, 2009) (advising executive agencies to understand the legitimate 
prerogatives of the states before preempting a state law, and outlining steps 
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movement instigates change, perhaps separation of powers can 
ride administrative federalism’s coattails. Second, administrative 
federalism’s impact on separation of powers will be indirect and 
thus relatively modest. This modesty may be a virtue, given that 
direct and more robust approaches to safeguarding separation of 
powers in and around the administrative state tend to face greater 
resistance. Resuscitating the nondelegation doctrine, for example, 
is a non-starter.20 Meanwhile, separating legislative, executive, 
and judicial functions within agencies occurs only as a matter of 
grace, only rarely, and not as a matter of constitutional law.21 
These features of modern government are too entrenched and, 
most believe, too important to uproot.22 Because we will not have 
separation-of-powers purity, second-best options in the form of 
checks-and-balances tend to be the only viable alternatives.23 
                                                                                                     
that agencies should take in making preemption decisions); see also Exec. Order 
No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (emphasizing the importance of 
early consultation with state and local officials). 
 18. Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional 
and State Authority? Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 
(2007); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 521, 555–61 (2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption]  
(discussing recent congressional concern and attention to administrative 
preemption in hearings and as reflected in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act). 
 19. See infra Part IV (exploring recent academic scholarship on 
administrative federalism). 
 20. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political 
Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (1985) (“The abstract 
appeal of the [nondelegation] doctrine vanishes rapidly . . . when it is tested in 
the crucible of reality.”). 
 21. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 1233–49 (describing how agencies 
generally “flout[] almost every important structural precept of the American 
constitutional order”). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 1232 (“[T]he essential features of the modern 
administrative state have . . . been taken as unchallengeable postulates by 
virtually all players in the legal and political worlds . . . .”); Peter B. McCutchen, 
Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a 
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17 (1994) 
(“Neither the cases sanctioning open-ended delegations of legislative power nor 
those broadly interpreting the commerce clause will be overturned.”). 
 23. See infra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing checks and 
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Administrative federalism is opportunity knocking, albeit at the 
side door.  
Approaching questions of administrative federalism through 
a cross-dimensional lens is also prudent. As will be shown, 
federalism-inspired proposals may be at cross-purposes with 
some conceptions of separation of powers.24 We should want to 
know when that is the case because a tradeoff in constitutional 
values may be required. For instance, enhancing states’ 
participatory role in administrative federalism decisions might 
bring us closer to some federalist ideal but, at the same time, 
take us further from some separation-of-powers ideal. Of course, 
what’s “ideal” for federalism and separation of powers are 
matters of taste and unrelenting debate. For that reason, this 
Article brackets those normative judgments as much as possible. 
Instead, this Article’s critical move is to bring federalism and 
separation of powers to the same table: as we ask what 
administrative federalism can do for federalism, we should also 
be asking what it can do for separation of powers. Given that 
variances in administrative federalism will affect separation of 
powers in different ways, it seems hazardous not to think in these 
cross-dimensional terms. To be sure, the cross-dimensional 
approach advanced here will not deliver universal answers about 
how to shape administrative federalism going forward. But it 
offers better purchase on the structural stakes inhering in those 
decisions.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides context and 
contour for this Article’s cross-dimensional approach to 
administrative federalism. History proves that federalism and 
separation of powers are not homeostatic concepts: today, we 
have many theories of federalism(s) and many theories of 
separation(s) of powers.25 This “structural pluralism,” as I call it, 
                                                                                                     
balances). 
 24. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of 
administrative federalism on separation of powers). 
 25. See Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 
1550–52 (2012) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism(s)] (tracing some of the various 
conceptions of federalism, and arguing that no one theory exists to “rule them 
all”); Jonathan Michaels, An Evolving, Enduring Separation of Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1–35) (tracing some of the 
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provides the vocabulary and grammar needed to understand the 
variability in how administrative federalism and separation of 
powers intersect. Part III describes the role of states in 
administrative governance, as shaped by existing judicial 
doctrines, legal instruments, and more informal arrangements. 
Part IV turns to the main event: first, it compares and contrasts 
what the major proposals for administrative federalism portend 
for our various conceptions of federalism(s); second, it mines what 
these same proposals entail for separation(s) of powers, and why 
it matters.  
II. Structural Pluralism 
Our constitutional structure is conventionally depicted two-
dimensionally: horizontally, power is dispersed among the federal 
branches; and vertically, power is dispersed between federal and 
state governments.26 This two-dimensional model usefully 
captures the Founders’ vision of separation of powers and 
federalism as two parts of an integrated system, working together 
to secure the people’s liberty.27 What this model fails to capture, 
however, is how separation of powers and federalism interact, or 
could interact, toward their common end. In short, what’s missing 
is a third cross-dimension, keyed to the contemporary 
relationships between separation of powers and federalism. This 
Article is part of a nascent scholarship that seeks to understand, 
                                                                                                     
various conceptions of separation of powers), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2444396; see also infra Part II (discussing 
these structural transformations). 
 26. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 
749, 750–52 (1999) (describing our system of government as “three branches of 
government arranged horizontally along functional lines” and vertically 
separated between the three branches of federal government and the states 
(footnote and quotations omitted)). 
 27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In the compound 
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people.”). 
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and harness, that relationship.28 First, however, this Part 
provides the building blocks: understanding how federalism and 
separation of powers connect in general, and in the ways 
developed here, requires appreciation for the pieces being 
connected.  
Subpart A begins with a brief account of the origins of 
separation of powers and federalism, and the values they were 
designed to serve. Subpart B describes the transformation to our 
modern separation(s) of powers with an emphasis on the 
administrative state. Subpart C describes our federalism(s), 
contextualizing where administrative federalism fits in. Subpart 
D outlines this Article’s approach to administrative federalism, 
situating it within a broader project of cross-dimensional study.  
A. Origins 
Horizontally, the Constitution vests the “legislative power” in 
Congress,
29
 the “executive” power in the President,
30
 and the 
“judicial” power in the Courts.
31
 Layered within this separation is 
a system of checks and balances, whereby certain federal action is 
made dependent on the consent or participation of multiple 
institutions.32 This tripartite division of functions was designed to 
secure liberty, in part, by diffusing federal power.33 The inability 
of any branch to dominate, on its own, was hoped to promote 
deliberation, representational accountability, and the rule of 
law.34 To be sure, this system of separated and balanced power 
                                                                                                     
 28. See infra Part II.D (discussing this movement and situating where a 
cross-dimensional approach to administrative federalism fits in). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing the President with veto 
power over legislation). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434–36, 446 (1987) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, New Deal]. 
 34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Abner S. Greene, Checks and 
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 132, 184 
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was expected to result in some government inefficiency.
35
 But the 
defeat of “a few good laws” was thought to be “amply 




Vertically, the Constitution divides federal and state 
governments.37 The Founders hoped this arrangement would 
advance the political marketplace as each level of government 
competed for the people’s loyalty.
38
 States could garner public 
support by passing favorable laws and by bringing politics closer 
to the people.
39
 Importantly, states would not only compete with 
each other but also with the central federal government.40 Again, 
though not necessarily efficient, the decentralization of power 
and the competition for political favor hoped to provide a critical 
                                                                                                     
(1994); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“The division of the 
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be 
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings.”). 
These institutional rivalries, however, were not guaranteed—and history has 
proved the rivalries to be politically contingent. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard 
H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2319 
(2006) (“Madison’s design was eclipsed almost from the outset by the emergence 
of robust democratic political [party] competition.”). 
 35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (acknowledging that 
“check[s] on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as 
beneficial”). 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 37.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
People.”). 
 38. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1450 (1987) (“As with separation of powers, federalism enabled the 
American People to conquer government power by dividing it.”); Robert F. 
Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in 
Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 100 (“[T]he Federalists understood and 
emphasized that influence through electoral politics presupposes that state 
governments would exist as alternative objects of loyalty to the national 
government.”). 
 39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (noting that “a greater 
number of individuals will expect to rise” into state government). 
 40. See Amar, supra note 38, at 1500–01 (“The People could confidently 
confer broad powers upon national agents precisely because they had also 
created a second set of specialized agents to monitor the first set . . . .”). 
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check against an overweening federal government.
41
 Critically, 
however, the idea that states would provide decentralized 
venues for politics and policy required leaving states 
something meaningful to do.42 Toward that end, the Founders 
sought to limit federal power by enumerating the subject 
matters over which it could attach.43 As Chief Justice Marshall 
famously pronounced in Gibbons v. Ogden, the enumeration of 
Congress’s powers “presupposes something not enumerated”44 
over which the states would retain autonomy.45 
The Founders fully appreciated that the Constitution’s 
parchment boundaries would be elusive and dynamic.46 James 
Madison prophesized that the Constitution would be “more or 
less obscure and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated 
and ascertained.”47 History has proven this dictum mostly 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id.; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the 
principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government 
power.”). 
 42. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 52 (2004) (“Just having state governments is not enough; those 
governments need to have meaningful things to do.”); James A. Gardner, The 
Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National 
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 1 (2013) (“American federalism 
contemplates that states will retain a significant degree of autonomy so that 
state power can serve as a meaningful counterweight to national power.”). 
 43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, 18 (providing examples of constitutional 
provisions limiting federal power); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) 
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government 
are few and defined.”); see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism 
and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 139 (2001) (“[T]he 
recognition of limits on federal regulatory authority will increase the sphere of 
individual autonomy.”). 
 44. 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824). 
 45. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 46. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (“[N]o skill in the science 
of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient 
certainty, its three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary. . . . 
Questions daily occur in the course of practice which prove the obscurity which 
reigns in these subjects . . . .”). 
 47. Id. 
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right.48 Changed circumstances have altered the relationships 
between our government institutions, time and again.49 Our 
contemporary understandings of separation(s) of powers and 
federalism(s) have mostly developed along separate tracks, which 
is how I treat them in Subparts B and C below. Later Parts will 
revisit the relationship between them. 
B. Separation(s) of Powers 
The operation of modern government poses significant 
challenges for our system of separated federal power. Chief 
Justice Roberts, recently writing for a three-judge dissent, hit all 
the familiar tropes: how agencies combine lawmaking, executive, 
and judicial functions; how “the administrative state wields vast 
power” that “touches almost every aspect” of our “social, economic 
and political activities;” how the President hardly controls the 
vast bureaucracy; how the Court defers to agencies’ 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes; how the “Framers could 
hardly have envisioned” this state of affairs and how it “would 
leave them rubbing their eyes” in disbelief.50  
The question, then, is how to square the administrative 
system with separation of powers. There is not one answer; there 
are answers. Here, I organize them along two spectrums: 
(1) formalism/functionalism and (2) internal/external checks and 
balances.  
                                                                                                     
 48. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of 
the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2003) (“Indeed, on the whole, 
both the scholarship and jurisprudence on separated powers is marked by its 
inconsistency and lack of synthesis.”). The part of Madison’s prophecy that 
awaits is the “liquidation” and “ascertainment” of constitutional meaning. 
Perhaps one day, but it is doubtful. 
 49. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 453–72 (1995) (proposing a theory to reconcile new 
readings of the Constitution with past understandings of the document). 
 50. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). All told, the Chief Justice granted that “it would be a bit 
much”—though just a bit—to describe this state of affairs as the Madisonian 
“definition of tyranny.” Id. at 1879. Still, he asserted, “the danger posed by the 
growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.” Id. 
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1. Formalism vs. Functionalism: From Separation to Checks and 
Balances 
The classic divide between formalism and functionalism 
offers competing conceptions of separation of powers. Formalism 
emphasizes the separateness of the federal lawmaking, executive, 
and judicial functions.51 To a “pure” formalist, “each of the three 
branches has exclusive authority to perform its assigned function, 
unless the Constitution itself permits an exception.”52 On this 
view, the administrative state is almost certainly 
unconstitutional.53 But it would be incredibly destabilizing to 
declare the administrative state invalid.54 More “moderate” 
formalists, therefore, adopt a “grandfathering strategy” that 
accepts certain aspects of the administrative governance as 
given.55 Most notably, Congress’s delegation of policymaking and 
the combination of functions in agencies are quintessential 
examples of grandfathered arrangements.56 Meanwhile, less 
entrenched administrative arrangements are subject to 
separation-of-powers purity.57  
                                                                                                     
 51. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of 
Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231–32 [hereinafter Merrill, Principle of 
Separation Powers]  (describing the “exclusive functions” approach embraced by 
pure formalists). 
 52. Id. 
 53. For a seminal treatment, see Lawson, supra note 11, at 1249 (observing 
that “[t]he actual structure and operation of the national government today has 
virtually nothing to do with the Constitution”); see also Peter L. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies] 
(noting that it is “difficult to accommodate both [our modern government] and 
our continuing assertion that the Constitution is law”). 
 54. See Merrill, Principle of Separation Powers, supra note 51, at 234 
(noting that formalism has been attacked for preventing the government from 
effectively responding to new needs). 
 55. See id. (“[P]reserving past deviations from formalist purity (like 
administrative agencies) based on stare decisis or a principle of historical 
settlement, while subjecting new innovation to scrutiny under a rigorous 
exclusive functions canon.”). 
 56. See Lawson, supra note 11 (describing these features of modern 
government as postulates). 
 57. See Merrill, Principle of Separation Powers, supra note 51, at 234. 
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Functionalism offers an alternative. It emphasizes the needs 
of a “working government” and generally eschews strict divisions 
of federal functions.58 Most functionalists retain liberty as the 
idealized end. But a reconstituted version of checks and balances, 
rather than compartmentalized divisions of power, is the favored 
means of securing that liberty.59  
2. Administrative Checks and Balances: From Without and 
Within  
As Cynthia Farina aptly explains, the administrative state 
“became constitutionally tenable because the Court’s vision of 
separation of powers evolved from the simple (but constraining) 
proposition that divided powers must not be commingled, to the 
more flexible (but far more complicated) proposition that power 
may be transferred so long as it will be adequately controlled.”60 
Still, how much control? Who should control? And what type of 
control? This portfolio of questions has felled as many trees as it 
has made professors tenured.61 Here, I can only sketch the array 
of perspectives, which I loosely group into three schools.  
                                                                                                     
 58. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-
of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 
(1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and Functional] (describing the functional 
approach as stressing the “core function and relationship” of the three branches 
of government); Merrill, Principle of Separation Powers, supra note 51, at 231 
(explaining that where formalists and functionalists “disagree is over what sorts 
of deviations are permitted from the one function–one branch equation”). 
 59. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 495 (explaining that, for functionalists, 
“[t]he text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters are relevant, but 
they are not sufficiently helpful in hard cases to be determinative; it is the basic 
structural principles that play the critical role.”). This was the Court’s approach 
in opinions such as Morrison v. Olson, which stressed that the three branches do 
not “operate with absolute independence.” 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (quoting 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)). The Constitution requires 
only that “the proper balance between the coordinate branches” be maintained. 
Id. at 695 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 60. Farina, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 13, at 487. 
 61. Including this professor. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Relative 
Checks: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2169 (2010) [hereinafter Rubenstein, Relative Checks] (offering a 
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The first school emphasizes external oversight and control of 
administrative agencies by the Congress, President, and Court.62 
The influence and contestation among these branch heads over 
administrative governance is thought to provide a 
constitutionally legitimate separation of powers.63 A second 
school emphasizes checks and balances from within 
                                                                                                     
framework of “relative-checks” that works toward optimizing each branch’s 
primary and checking functions, depending on the type of issue involved, and 
the relative institutional competencies of the branches). For some other 
representative views, see Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 3, at 471 
(advancing the view that agencies are capable of controlling themselves); Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2298–99 (2001) 
(suggesting that the President exerts significant control over agencies); Gillian 
E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External 
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 439–40 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, 
Interdependent Relationship] (describing the shared control of courts and agency 
personnel over agency actions).  
 62. See Rubenstein, Relative Checks, supra note 61, at 2186–213 
(describing these modes of external oversight and how they interact to control 
administrative agencies). For its part, Congress structures agencies, establishes 
their regulatory goals and mandates, monitors agency action through oversight 
committees, controls funding, and, if necessary, overrides agency action through 
new legislation. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 61, 67 (2006) (describing congressional control over agencies); 
Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 
(1984) (same). Meanwhile, the President monitors and shapes agency action in a 
variety of ways, including oversight through the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the appointment and removal of agency officials, and 
otherwise through informal modes of influence. See Kagan, supra note 61, at 
2298–99 (detailing the formal and informal modes through which the President 
can influence agency officials); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” 
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1151 (2010) 
(“[O]ver 90 percent of economically significant rules underwent some change or 
withdrawal during the OIRA review process.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed 
Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 667 (2004) (reporting “strong 
evidence of presidential influence over agency policy”); Mark B. Seidenfeld, The 
Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1449–50 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Role of Politics] 
(outlining presidential control).  
 63. For classic expositions of this approach, see Strauss, Formal and 
Functional, supra note 58; Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 53. 
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administrative agencies rather than from without.64 Under this 
school of thought, the most durable and effective checks are a 
collection of “hard” and “soft” administrative features. Examples 
of hard structural features include: (1) the disaggregation of 
power within administrative agencies;65 (2) the civil service, 
which is thought to serve as a counterweight to politically-
appointed agency officials;66 and (3) administrative processes, 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, which offer access for 
public participation in administrative decisionmaking.67 Softer 
features include an administrative culture of professionalism and 
expertise.68 On this view, agency bureaucrats can be trusted to 
advance the public good. Moreover, agencies will know—aided by 
public input—which policies best advance the collective good.69  
                                                                                                     
 64. See Dawn Johnson, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2007) (advocating 
intra-Executive legal constraints in light of the “inherent inadequacies of the 
courts and Congress as external checks on the President”); Metzger, 
Interdependent Relationship, supra note 61, at 439–40 (explaining that “internal 
mechanisms often operate continuously, rather than being limited to issues that 
generate congressional attention or arise in the form of a justiciable challenge”).  
 65. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian C. Vermeule, Allocating Power Within 
Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (explaining that power is allocated 
both horizontally and vertically within agencies); Michael Asimow, When the 
Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 759, 761–77, 779–81 (1981) (examining the statutory and 
constitutional law controlling the separation of functions in agencies); Metzger, 
Interdependent Relationship, supra note 61, at 426–37 (describing examples of 
administrative structures that serve an internal separation-of-powers function 
and their constitutional implications). 
 66. For discussions of the how the civil service arguably keeps the 
Executive in check, see, for example, Shapiro, supra note 7 (acknowledging the 
discretion of agencies and suggesting methods of making agencies more 
accountable). 
 67. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 209–10 (2012) 
(arguing that the President’s behavior is constrained by such processes). 
 68. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 463 (describing administrative law 
history as a series of “attempts to legitimize unelected public administration”); 
see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 20 (2010) (“Related to the goal of 
expertise is a desire to insulate agency decisions from the sort of political horse-
trading that is anathema to impartial decision making.”). 
 69. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 3, at 471 (“[R]ather 
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The third school emphasizes the reciprocity between internal 
and external controls.70 For example, administrative notice-and-
comment rulemaking provides access to citizens and public-
interest groups, who in turn may bring grievances externally to 
one or more branch-heads.71 Likewise, courts engaging in 
external judicial review depend on agency personnel to first 
collect information internally and to explain the agency’s 
decisions under review.72 On this account, external checks act 
                                                                                                     
than employing external constraints . . . , the [expertise] model relie[s] on 
internal ones.”); Hammond H. Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the 
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1771 (2012) (describing the “important 
role” of expertise “as an anchor of regulatory legitimacy that has shaped the 
relationship between courts and agencies”); Mark B. Seidenfeld, A Syncopated 
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 90 (1994) (explaining that the 
expertise model rests, in large part, on “characterizing agency decisions as 
technical and therefore value-neutral”). 
 70. See, e.g., Metzger, Interdependent Relationship, supra note 61, at 437–
47 (“Bringing the interdependence of internal and external separation-of-powers 
mechanisms to the forefront facilitates a more realistic assessment of what 
internal Executive Branch constraints can accomplish.”); Seidenfeld, Role of 
Politics, supra note 62, at 1451 (describing the limits of political control of 
agencies); see also David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 963, 966–67 (1999) (observing that agencies are influenced 
“by the President, by interest groups, by the courts, and by the bureaucrats 
themselves”). 
 71. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS: 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 426, 427–30 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan 
eds., 1987) (distinguishing between police-patrol oversight and fire-alarm 
oversight); Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the 
Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 739 (2002) 
(explaining that the Freedom of Information Act “gave ordinary citizens, for the 
first time, legal rights to a large amount of formerly secret government 
information”). But cf. David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using 
Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 417–19 (1999) 
(describing the lack of empirical support for the structure and process 
hypothesis). 
 72. See Metzger, Interdependent Relationship, supra note 61, at 445 (noting 
that courts have invoked their dependency on agency personnel “to justify the 
requirement that agencies disclose underlying information and offer detailed 
explanations of their decisions”). 
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mostly to deter misguided agency action but in a relaxed form 
that accounts for internal checks and balances.73 
In short, the oldest question of administrative law has many 
answers and no clear winners. These answers will become 
relevant again in Part IV, which explores what administrative 
federalism can do for separation(s) of powers in and around the 
administrative state. First, however, the analysis hooks back to 
the oldest question of constitutional law—federalism—and the 
plurality of viewpoints that it likewise has generated. These too 
will be relevant in Part IV, which unpacks how different 
proposals for administrative federalism favor different 
conceptions of federalism(s).  
C. Federalism(s) 
Differences in federalism theory arise because there is little 
agreement about what federalism requires. Most agree that it 
requires dual sovereignty—the existence of both state and federal 
governments.74 Yet there is little consensus beyond that. And, 
like for separation of powers, there is more than one way to slice 
the federalism pie. Here, I offer two: (1) along a state-authority 
spectrum; and (2) along a spectrum of institutional deciders.75 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Michaels, supra note 25 (manuscript at 30) (“[B]ecause of a robust 
fallback system of administrative checks and balances, the courts are 
comfortable taking ‘a relaxed view’ of otherwise-suspect inter-branch 
maneuverings.”). 
 74. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1311, 1336–37 (1997) (“The Constitution . . . established a government of 
dual sovereigns, in which the federal government exercised only limited, 
enumerated powers and in which the states, by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, 
‘retain substantial sovereign authority.’”). 
 75. For a sampling of other efforts to identify the many conceptions of 
federalism, see Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) (distinguishing between the Supreme Court’s 
positive conception of federalism and scholars’ negative conception of 
federalism); Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285 
(2008) (explaining that there are three versions of federalism, each with distinct 
origins); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1763, 1766–69 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court shifts between two 
different models of federalism); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of 
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Collectively, these approaches capture most—yet surely not all—
of our federalism(s).76 Still, the following account will satisfy my 
broader objectives, which are to situate where administrative 
federalism fits within the federalism landscape and to 
disaggregate the strands of federalism(s) within administrative 
federalism itself.  
1. State Authority: Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Agency  
At one level, federalism theory divides along a spectrum of 
state authority, ranging from sovereignty, to autonomy, to 
agency. The “sovereignty-model” of federalism favors state 
insulation from federal interference (a negative right) and the 
ability of autonomous self-rule (a positive right).77 Much of the 
Court’s pre-New Deal jurisprudence endorsed this view of 
federal–state separateness under the label “dual federalism.”78 
                                                                                                     
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994) 
(arguing that only one of the three models of federalism is compatible with 
political reality). 
 76. Judith Resnik’s recent work on “federalism(s)” catalogues a vast 
collection: “[A]dministrative federalism, cooperative federalism, competitive 
federalism, creative federalism, cultural federalism, dialectical federalism, 
dialogical federalism, dual federalism, fiscal federalism, intrastatutory 
federalism, noncategorical federalism, polyphonic federalism, territorial 
federalism, and the like.” Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’s Forms and Norms: 
Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing 
Accommodations, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 371 (James E. 
Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014). 
 77. See Gerken, Federalism(s), supra note 25, at 1553 (“[C]hampions of 
sovereignty believe that federalism will succeed only if states enjoy the power to 
rule without interference in a policymaking domain of their own.”); Frank I. 
Michelman, States’ Rights and States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192–95 (1977) (arguing 
that sovereignty is not merely an abstraction). 
 78. For an account of dual federalism’s history, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes 
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831–54 (1998). 
Though much of the Court’s pre-New Deal jurisprudence endorsed dual 
federalism, not all of it did. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into 
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 228–31, 268–69 
(2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting the Politics Back] (offering a revisionist 
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Although dual federalism is now famously dead,79 the 
sovereignty-model’s commitment to state autonomy lives on.  
Unlike the sovereignty model, the “autonomy model” does not 
resist regulatory subject matter overlap between federal and 
state governments.80 For example, it is not a problem for 
autonomists that the federal government regulates in areas of 
traditional state concern.81 The autonomy model, however, insists 
that Congress must leave states free to govern autonomously in 
the regulatory domains that Congress leaves to them.82 That 
means limiting how the federal government interacts with states. 
State autonomy is breached, for example, “when the federal 
government dictates the structure of state governments, 
commandeers the energy of state administrators, or forces state 
enactment of particular laws.”83 Cases such as New York v. 
United States,84 Printz v. United States,85 and most recently, 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,86 reflect 
this conception of the autonomy model.87  
                                                                                                     
take on the Court’s pre-New Deal federalism jurisprudence). For normative 
defenses of dual federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited 
and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
752 (1995); Yoo, supra note 74, at 1404–05. 
 79. See generally Edwin S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (1950) (describing this transformation). 
 80. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 795, 799 (1996) (advocating for a federalism “based not on policing 
definitive and categorical jurisdictional boundaries . . . but on policing 
Congress’s deliberative processes and its reasons for regulating”). 
 81. See id. at 796–97 (“[W]here state power is not exclusive, there are no 
constitutional constraints in the name of federalism on Congress’s exercise of its 
concurrent powers.”). 
 82. See Merritt, supra note 75, at 1571 (“Congress can always narrow the 
orbit of state power, but it must leave the states free to govern autonomously in 
whatever areas are left to them.”). 
 83. Id. at 1571. 
 84. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 85. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
 86. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 87. See id. (holding that Congress could not compel states to expand 
Medicaid coverage); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding that Congress could not 
commandeer state officials to enforce federal gun-control laws); New York, 505 
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Within the autonomy camp, however, questions persist over 
how much autonomy states should have. A conventional view is 
that states must retain enough autonomy to exist as credible 
staging grounds for political and regulatory expression.88 As 
Ernest Young explains, “[s]tates cannot function as checks on the 
power of the central government, or as laboratories of 
experimental regulation, if they lack the institutional ability to 
govern themselves in meaningful ways.”89  
Moreover, theories differ on what even qualifies as state 
autonomy—and, in particular, where “cooperative federalism” 
schemes fit in.90 The term cooperative federalism generally 
                                                                                                     
U.S. at 188 (holding that Congress could not commandeer state legislators to 
implement a federal program for low-level radioactive waste disposal).  
 88. See James A. Gardner, Federalism and Subnational Political 
Community, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 153, 154–55 (2014) [hereinafter Gardner, 
Subnational Political Community] (expressing the view that autonomy is an 
essential feature of states as formal political communities); Merritt, supra note 
75, at 1573–75 (asserting that there are “at least four values in the continued 
existence of autonomous state governments”); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for 
Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1395 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two 
Cheers] (proposing that “judicial doctrines of federalism ought to be designed in 
such a way as to reinforce political and institutional checks on federal power”). 
 89. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 88, at 1358 n.42; accord Gardner, 
Subnational Political Community, supra note 88, at 154–55 (arguing that 
“effective execution of the constitutional plan requires states to be political 
communities,” which allows them “to make independent and self-generated 
judgments about the two most important considerations informing the 
contestatory dynamic of federalism: the welfare of their citizens and the 
performance of the federal government”). For further treatment of how states 
operate as a check on federal power, see Amar, supra note 38, at 1500–03; 
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1988); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. 
CT. REV. 341, 380–95. For further treatment of how states operate as 
laboratories of regulatory experimentation, see, e.g., Merritt, The Guarantee 
Clause, at 9; Charles Fried, Federalism—Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y. 1, 2–3 (1982). 
 90. For prominent examples of cooperative federalism, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g) (2012) (immigration); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006) (Clean Water 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006) (Clean 
Air Act); 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (2006) (telecommunications); Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1042(a)(2), 
124 Stat. 1376, 2012–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2012)) (financial 
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connotes statutory arrangements in which states implement a 
federally prescribed program or goal.91 Cooperative federalism 
arrangements position the federal and the state governments in a 
type of principal–agent relationship, with states acting as 
agent.92 Because of that subordination, the autonomy model does 
not neatly capture cooperative-federalism arrangements.93  
The “agency model,” however, aims to bring cooperative 
federalism into the fold.94 As forcefully advanced by Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken, a significant and valuable 
power “reside[s] in the states when they play the role of federal 
servants.”95 They explain how the federal government “depend[s]” 
on state officials to administer federal programs, which, in turn, 
provides states “leverage” and “discretion in choosing how to 
accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to prioritize.”96 
Moreover, they argue, regular interactions between federal and 
state officials generate trust and the power to dissent as insiders 
rather than outsiders to the federal system.97 Professors Bulman-
Pozen and Gerken stress that their agency model captures 
                                                                                                     
regulation); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 
§§ 1101, 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 141–43, 173–79, 186 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 18001, 18031, 18041) (healthcare). 
 91. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 672 (2001) (describing the factors 
influencing “[t]he federal government’s increasing willingness to allow states to 
superintend the implementation of federal law”). 
 92. See id. at 691 (stating a theory that state institutions for local 
governance compete among each other to act as agents of Congress). 
 93. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism: Colorado’s 
Legalization of Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1067, 1072 (2014) (“To understand cooperative federalism . . . we must pull out 
of our usual federalism bundle the insistence on an autonomous state sphere.”). 
 94. See id. at 1072–74 (noting that the principal agent relationship does not 
mean states are powerless in their role as agents). 
 95. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265 (2009). 
 96. Id. at 1266. 
 97. See id. at 1268–69 (arguing that this trust gives “lower-level 
decisionmakers the knowledge and relationships they need to work the 
system”). 
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something quite different than main-line conceptions of state 
autonomy.98 Still, they insist that it qualifies as federalism.99 
2. Institutional Deciders 
The enduring question of how to maintain federalism is, in 
large measure, a debate over who decides the boundaries and 
relationships between the federal and state governments. In some 
measure, all of the federal branches play a part, as do the states 
themselves. But what role does, or should, each institution play? 
And how do, or should, those roles overlap and relate? We cannot 
understand our federalism(s)—or administrative federalism in 
particular—without regard to these first-order questions. The 
discussion below sketches how federalism’s center of gravity has 
institutionally shifted (1) from courts to Congress, and then 
(2) from Congress to agencies.  
                                                                                                     
 98. See id. at 1268 (explaining that the agency model does not emphasize 
separateness and independence); see also Gerken, Federalism(s), supra note 25, 
at 1561 (arguing that the autonomy enjoyed by state servants “is quite different 
from that typically contemplated by federalism scholars” because “[t]he 
servant’s power to decide is interstitial and contingent on the national 
government’s choice not to eliminate it”). 
 99. See Gerken, Federalism(s), supra note 25, at 1561 n.48 (noting that 
there are many federalisms and “the typical federalism scholar does not state 
explicitly that we must have one theory to rule them all”); Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The 
Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1920, 1923 (2014) [hereinafter 
Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty] (arguing that federalism is located “in the 
legally and politically generative interaction among the state and federal 
governments and the American people”). For other accounts of how cooperative-
federalism arrangements promote federalism values, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972) (proposing 
that the states and the federal government have a web of cooperative 
relationships through the federalist system); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544, 1554 (1994) (discussing how working 
alliances form between federal and state counterparts). For arguments about 
the values of federal–state regulatory overlap more generally, see ROBERT A. 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS (2009); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: 
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 646, 682 (1981). 
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a. From Court to Congress 
The sovereignty model’s historic downfall is most commonly 
attributed to the Court’s relaxation of its enumerated powers and 
nondelegation doctrines in the New Deal era and beyond.100 
Initially, the Court’s abstention in policing the federal–state 
boundary was mostly cabined to contexts involving the regulation 
of private conduct.101 Later, in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority,102 the Court openly renounced 
substantively policing Congress’s enumerated powers when 
Congress directly regulates the states.103 According to the Court, 
the states’ protection from federal overreaching is political and 
procedural, not judicial.104 The judicial role, the Court explained, 
is merely to ensure that “the internal safeguards of the political 
process have performed as intended”105 and to intervene only as 
necessary to “compensate for possible failings in the national 
political process.”106  
Garcia marked the turn toward “process federalism,”107 
which focuses on who makes federal law and the processes for 
                                                                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 79 (describing these developments as the 
death-knell of dual federalism).  
 101. The Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn is often regarded as the 
high-water mark, or the low, depending on who is doing the telling. 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (holding, in very deferential terms, that Congress has the power to 
regulate home consumption of wheat).  
 102. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 103. See id. at 579 (rejecting challenge to Congress’s expansion of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to cover certain state employers); see also Jesse H. Choper, 
Federalism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 579 
(1994) (“The reach of the [Garcia] Court’s doctrine . . . was specifically confined 
to national regulation of the ‘States as States’; it clearly did not apply . . . to 
federal regulation of private persons or activities within the states.”). 
 104. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (describing the structural protections for 
states in the national arena). 
 105. Id. at 554. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See generally Rapaczynski, supra note 89 (explaining that Garcia’s 
main thrust was to replace a sovereignty-based analysis with a focus on the 
nature of the political process responsible for making the federalism-related 
decisions). Even before Garcia, Professor Herbert Wechsler famously advanced 
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making it.108 To that end, process federalists put faith in the so-
called “political and procedural safeguards of federalism.”109 The 
political safeguards refer to a collection of structural and political 
arrangements, including, most importantly, states’ equal 
representation in the Senate.110 The procedural safeguard refers 
to the federal lawmaking process.111 As Bradford Clark explains, 
federal lawmaking procedures serve an inertial function that 
protects state prerogatives “simply by . . . making ‘the supreme 
Law of the Land’ more difficult to adopt. If any of the specified 
veto players withhold their consent, then no new federal law is 
created and preexisting state and federal law remains in 
effect.”112  
Critics of process federalism, however, maintain that the 
political process does not safeguard federalism very well.113 One 
                                                                                                     
the “political safeguard” theory of federalism, which the Court in Garcia 
expressly relied upon. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (citing Herbert J. Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 
544–45 (1954)). 
 108. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 88, at 1364 (defining process 
federalism as “reliance on political and institutional safeguards to preserve 
balance in the federal structure,” and arguing that “[p]rocess federalism’s 
central insight is that the federal-state balance is affected not simply by what 
federal law is made, but by how that law is made”). 
 109. Id. at 1368. 
 110. Although the political safeguards referred to by the Court in Garcia 
were mostly structural, later theorists supplemented this account. In his 
seminal work, for example, Larry Kramer argues that political safeguards for 
state interests endure today through political parties and the “political 
dependency” between state and federal officials. See Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back, supra note 78, at 215, 282 & n.267.  
 111. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 88, at 1362 (explaining how the 
federal lawmaking process operates as a procedural safeguard). 
 112. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers]; see 
also Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional 
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1792 
(2005) (“A national government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will 
tend to leave considerable scope for state autonomy.”). 
 113. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 2, at 2137 (collecting sources); see 
also Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
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pair of objections is that states cannot, or do not, reliably fight for 
their institutional interests in Congress.114 Another objection is 
that many decisions affecting states today are not actually made 
by Congress; rather, federal agencies make those decisions.115 
These assaults strike at the heart of process federalism. If neither 
the Court nor Congress is reliably safeguarding federalism today, 
then who is? Enter administrative federalism.  
b. From Congress to Agencies 
Administrative federalism features agencies, rather than 
Congress, as the primary deciders of where to draw lines between 
federal and state authority.116 That move alters not only who 
decides federalism (from Congress to agencies) but also the 
process by which these questions are decided (from the ensnarling 
legislative process to more pliant administrative modes).117 
Moreover, the shift from Congress to agencies alters the 
decisionmaker’s political constituency.118 Whereas members of 
                                                                                                     
Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (arguing that 
reliance on politics to safeguard federalism is like “reinforcing the walls of a 
sand castle as the tide returns”). 
 114. There are many proffered reasons for this. As Justice O’Connor 
explained in New York v. United States, “powerful incentives” might impel state 
officials “to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal 
interests.” 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992); Calabresi, supra note 78, at 752, 797–98 
(echoing this point); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in 
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 920, 940–41 (2005) (same); Yoo, 
supra note 74, at 1399–1400 (same). Moreover, state officials have any number 
of incentives to subvert institutional interests: whether “to avoid responsibility” 
for difficult problems; “to obtain more federal funding”; or “because federal 
regulation would advance partisan, ideological, or constituent interests.” Miriam 
L. Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 953, 983 (2014) [hereinafter Seifter, Interest Groups]. 
 115. See, e.g., Seifter, Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 976 (stating that 
federal agencies often act without direction from Congress). 
 116. See Miriam L. Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 443, 445–46 (2014) [hereinafter Seifter, States] (describing administrative 
federalism and the power it gives agencies). 
 117. See id. at 446. 
 118. See id. at 502 (discussing decision makers’ effects on political 
 
198 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (2015) 
Congress are more likely to represent and be held accountable to 
their state constituents, agencies have no political constituents.119 
The President may or may not be held politically accountable for 
agency action,120 but, in any event, the President’s constituency is 
national, not state or locally based.121  
Administrative federalism is an irony, if not an oxymoron. 
Agencies implement their delegated power in ways that overlap 
and compete with state authority over the same subjects.122 In 
addition, the Court has held that agencies may preempt state law 
in much the same way that Congress does: either by asserting 
exclusive federal control over a regulatory field or by issuing 
administrative policies that conflict with state law.123 Agencies 
                                                                                                     
constituencies); cf. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 
280 (“[S]hifting preemptive authority away from Congress to . . . executive 
institutions that do not represent the states . . . amounts to a significant threat 
to state autonomy.”). 
 119. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agendy Preemption: More 
Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 203 (2009) (“States are 
obviously not represented within agencies, which are purely national, unelected 
institutions . . . .”). 
 120. Although the President is generally thought to have effective control 
over so-called “executive agencies,” see generally Kagan, supra note 61, the point 
is debatable. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In any event, the general consensus is that the 
President has little control over so-called “independent agencies,” whose heads 
are statutorily and constitutionally protected from presidential removal. See 
Neal E. Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 
(2008) (explaining how institutional design features limit presidential control of 
independent agencies). 
 121. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 481 (“[T]he President is 
responsive to the majority of the American people because he caters to a 
national constituency . . . .”). 
 122. See Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy From 
Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 58 (2008) (“[T]he 
underenforcement of federalism is exacerbated in the administrative law 
context because Congress can freely delegate its broad Commerce Clause powers 
to unelected federal agencies, which can then easily encroach on state 
autonomy.”). 
 123. See generally, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); 
City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
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thus wield an extraordinary power in our federalist system—they 
may displace the laws of all fifty states without the political or 
procedural protections that states otherwise enjoy in the 
legislative forum.124 Moreover, agencies tend to be mission-centric 
institutions, not designed or expected to “ponder larger structural 
issues such as the relative balance of power between the federal 
and state governments,” or the “abstract values” of federalism 
more generally.125 On this telling, the rise of administrative 
governance is arguably federalism’s greatest threat, not its 
savior. 
But champions of administrative federalism offer a counter-
narrative.126 Some argue that agencies are better suited than 
Congress to decide questions of federalism, especially concerning 
whether state law should be preempted by a national standard.127 
                                                                                                     
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); see also infra notes 187–198 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s administrative-preemption doctrine). 
 124. For a critical treatment of the Court’s administrative-preemption 
doctrine, see Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16, at 320–26 (arguing that the 
Court’s approach to administrative preemption is inconsistent not only with its 
separation-of-powers theory of nondelegation but also its “political safeguards” 
theory of federalism).  
 125. Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer 
Protection Laws, Inc. as Amicus Curias in Support of Respondent at 23, Wyeth 
v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249, 2008 WL 3851615); accord 
Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of 
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 13, 26–27 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) 
(noting concern that agencies are “focused on federal needs and powers,” and 
thus “ill-suited to weigh . . . state and local interests” when making federal 
policy).  
 126. See Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty, supra note 99, at 1922 (“The 
administrative state . . .  [has] been reimagined as guardian[], rather than 
slayer[], of American federalism.”); Nourse, supra note 26, at 778 (“It is often 
complained . . . [that] if the Congress did not delegate so frequently to the 
Executive Branch our national government would not be as powerful as it is 
relative to the states.”). 
 127. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1933, 1939 (2008) (arguing that agencies “outperform” other branches in 
“allocating policymaking power” between federal and state governments); see 
also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability “Agency-Forcing” 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127–28, 2158–63 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Accountability] (claiming that “federal agencies . . . surprisingly emerge as the 
 
200 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (2015) 
Other administrative federalists do not necessarily favor agencies 
over Congress as federal lawmaker. Still, they recognize that 
federalism is now mostly played in the administrative arena.128 
With a few tweaks to the system, they argue, federalism’s future 
will be secure.129  
Limning the growing menu of administrative federalism 
proposals will have to wait.130 The immediate point is that 
administrative federalism is a work in progress: the proposals 
                                                                                                     
best possible protectors of state regulatory interests” and suggesting that 
agencies be “reform[ed] . . . to ensure they can become a rich forum for 
participation by state governmental entities”); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2080–81 (2008) 
[hereinafter Metzger, Administrative Law] (challenging the conventional view 
that Congress is more sensitive “to state regulatory prerogatives than federal 
agencies”). 
 128. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 567, 570, 578–79 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism] (noting “the 
central importance of the administrative sphere to modern-day federalism,” 
because agencies will make “[c]ritical decisions about the actual scope of state 
powers and autonomy”); Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127, at 2128 
(advancing a similar claim).  
 129. For some representative works, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 127, 
at 2020 (discussing how courts can “achieve the ends sought by federalism”); 
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 695 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson, Presumption Against] 
(suggesting that the Court extend its presumption against preemption to the 
administrative-preemption context); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and 
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 727 (2008) [hereinafter 
Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice] (modeling an approach to 
administrative federalism based on the institutional capacities of Congress, 
courts and agencies); Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2109 
(explaining why “the future of federalism lies in integrating protections for the 
states into agency deliberations and judicial review of agency action”); Sharkey, 
Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 570–95 (offering a number of 
proposals for institutional change); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 869 (2008) [hereinafter Young, Executive 
Preemption] (offering a number of proposals for administrative preemption). For 
some of my own work in the area, see generally David S. Rubenstein, Delegating 
Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2012) [hereinafter Rubenstein, Delegating 
Supremacy?] (arguing that many of the problems associated with administrative 
federalism can be alleviated by foreclosing administrative preemption). 
 130. See infra Part III (discussing the role of states administrative processes 
and decisionmaking). 
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advanced under its banner compete not only for a place in the 
current system but also against each other.131   
D. Cross-Dimensional Structuralism  
The cross-dimensional relationship between federalism and 
separation of powers has mostly been sporadic and unappreciated 
in constitutional discourse.132 There are, however, some 
important exceptions. One strand of literature suggests that 
separation of powers can safeguard federalism; another strand 
explains how federalism can safeguard separation of powers.133 
When considered together, the outlines of a “cross-dimensional 
structuralism” emerge.  
 Still, however, broad headlines of “Separation of Powers as a 
Safeguard of Federalism”134 and “Federalism as a Safeguard of 
Separation of Powers”135 belie an important nuance: namely, we 
have federalism(s) and we have separation(s) of power. Thus, to 
say that federalism can safeguard separation of powers, or vice 
versa, merely begs which conceptions of federalism(s) and 
separation(s) of powers are being treated and which are doing the 
                                                                                                     
 131. See infra Part IV (discussing proposals for administrative federalism). 
 132. Of course, there are important exceptions in the case law. See, e.g., INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950 (1983) (explaining how the separation-of-powers 
requirement of bicameralism reinforced “the Great Compromise, under which 
[the House of Representatives] was viewed as representing the people and the 
[Senate] the states”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (noting 
that Congress undermines “the separation and equilibration of powers” when it 
demands that states, rather than the Executive Branch, administer federal 
programs). There are also important exceptions in academic commentary. See 
infra notes 143–158 and accompanying text (discussing some of this literature 
and collecting citations). 
 133. See infra notes 143–158 and accompanying text (discussing these 
movements). 
 134. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1459 (explaining 
how formal lawmaking procedures can advance state autonomy). 
 135. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the 
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 503 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-
Pozen, Safeguard] (explaining how states can check federal power from within 
cooperative-federalism schemes). 
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treatment.136 While other scholars have explored the relationship 
between certain types of federalism(s) and separation(s) of 
powers,137 this Article is the first to probe what administrative 
federalism, in particular, can do for administrative separation of 
powers.138  
As developed in Part IV, how we advance administrative 
federalism—more specifically, which version of it—matters for 
federalism and separation of powers simultaneously.139 This 
dynamic owes, in part, to the relationship between administrative 
law and separation of powers: administrative law is the vessel 
through which constitutional norms are translated and expressed 
in the administrative system.140 Adjustments to that system, even 
if garbed in federalism, can thus have indirect bearing on 
separation of powers. In mind is a functional, not formal, 
separation of powers that contemplates both external and 
internal administrative checks-and-balances.141  
In one respect, the organizing principle of this Article is old: 
federalism and separation of powers were originally designed to 
work together to secure the people’s liberty.142 In more important 
respects, however, this is new: the federalism and separation of 
                                                                                                     
 136. This is not intended as a critique of the titles Professor Clark and 
Professor Bulman-Pozen selected for their respective works. Rather, it is only to 
emphasize that neither author purports to explain how all of our conceptions of 
separations of powers and federalism might interact. 
 137. See infra notes 143–169 and accompanying text (discussing some of this 
literature). 
 138. See infra notes 146–172 and accompanying text (noting some related 
projects by others that have influenced some of my thinking here). 
 139. See infra Part IV. 
 140. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 953 (1997) (noting that modern conditions and 
expectations demanded that “the constitutional mold had to be broken and the 
administrative state invented”). 
 141. See supra Part II.B (discussing these conceptions). 
 142. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (arguing that 
separation of powers and federalism would, together, provide a “double security” 
for the people’s liberty); see also Calvin Masey, State Standing After 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 273–76 (2009) (noting that “both 
separation of powers and federalism are structural doctrines designed to check 
concentration of power” and should “join” in that goal).  
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powers experienced today are not those of our Founding Fathers 
(or, for that matter, our fathers or grandfathers). 
As noted above, this Article’s cross-dimensional approach to 
administrative federalism contributes to a larger project of cross-
dimensional study. Professor Clark, for example, argues that 
separation of powers formalism advances process federalism.143 
More specifically, he explains how a formalistic approach to 
federal lawmaking, which requires Congress to make federal 
“Law,” best fulfills the political and procedural safeguards of 
federalism.144 His core insight is that state interests will be best 
protected in the federal institution—Congress—that was 
designed to protect those interests.145  
But inasmuch as that is true, a breakdown in lawmaking 
formalism, where agencies make law, portends a breakdown in 
process federalism.146 Agencies, unlike Congress, are not 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1326 (discussing 
the relationship between separation of powers and federalism). 
 144. See id. at 1324–26 (arguing procedural safeguards of federalism are 
best fulfilled when Congress makes law); see also supra notes 110, 112 and 
accompanying text (discussing these safeguards). 
 145. See id. (arguing the Founders’ intent was for Congress to protect state 
interest and that intent should be respected); see also Bradford R. Clark, 
Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1421, 1421–23 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional Compromise] 
(explaining the background and context of establishing protection for states’ 
rights during the Constitutional Convention). 
 146. Because of this, Professor Clark expresses some discomfort with 
administrative preemption of state law. Still, he seems willing to make 
conceptual peace with the practice. When Congress delegates policymaking 
power to agencies, Professor Clark suggests, it is effectively Congress that 
preempts state law, thus potentially alleviating any Supremacy Clause problem. 
See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1433–34 (noting that 
Supremacy Clause issues are solved because Congress is preempting state law, 
not the agency). This functionalist conception, however, does little if anything to 
actually promote the type of political and procedural safeguards of federalism 
that Professor Clark seems to have in mind. I have speculated elsewhere that 
Professor Clark’s accommodation for administrative preemption seems 
principally motivated by a desire to narrow the gap between his formalist 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, on the one hand, and the Court’s 
functional approach to delegation, on the other. See generally Rubenstein, 
Paradox, supra note 16, at 295. 
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politically beholden to the states.147 And agencies can make policy 
far more easily than Congress can; indeed, that is one reason why 
Congress delegates to agencies in the first place.148 In short, 
lawmaking formalism might advance the political and procedural 
safeguards of federalism.149 But the way law is actually made 
today—mostly by federal agencies150—leaves a gap in Professor 
Clark’s account that this Article helps to fill. 
Working in the inverse direction, some notable scholars 
explain how federalism can safeguard separation of powers. Most 
relevant here, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Roderick Hills, and Phillip 
Weiser (writing separately) argue that cooperative-federalism 
arrangements can advance functional separation of powers.151 
Their collective idea, in short, is that states can operate as a 
check on the Executive Branch.152 According to Professors Hills 
                                                                                                     
 147. See Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16, at 323–24 (“Agencies are not 
beholden to states in any politically thick sense.”). 
 148. See id. at 59 (discussing how the political and procedural safeguards of 
federalism are compromised when agencies preempt state law). 
 149. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1325–26 (noting 
that a formalist approach to lawmaking secures federalism); INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that “the sheer amount of 
law” made by agencies has “far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by 
Congress through the traditional process” for some time).  
 150. See Keller, supra note 122, at 47–48 (discussing how federal agencies 
make law).  
 151. See generally, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Federalism in Constitutional 
Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 185–86 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, 
Constiutional Context] (“[T]he possibility of cooperative federalism makes it 
easier to accomplish two goals of the ‘separation of powers’ doctrine . . . .”); 
Bulman-Pozen, Safeguard, supra note 135, at 504 (“[C]ooperative federalism 
schemes may usefully advance the formal separation of particular powers.”); 
Weiser, supra note 91, at 719 (discussing the separation-of-powers benefits of 
cooperative-federalism). In another important work, Brannon Denning and 
Michael Ramsey offer an account of how foreign affairs federalism can safeguard 
separation of powers. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American 
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign 
Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 829–30 (2004) (explaining how a “robust 
foreign affairs federalism promotes a cooperative approach to foreign affairs, 
because the President will need the support of Congress to oust disruptive state 
laws; as a result, more foreign affairs decisionmaking will be done by Congress 
(or the Senate)”). 
 152. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 91, at 717 (discussing some ways in which 
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and Weiser, cooperative federalism deprives the Executive 
Branch of a monopoly on administering federal programs.153 On 
this view, “Congress can achieve fidelity to the spirit of federal 
laws by playing nonfederal and federal governments against each 
other . . . and threatening to replace one with the other if it 
misbehaves.”154 Moreover, as Professor Hills explains, the 
autonomy that states receive under the Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine enables nonfederal officials to remain 
sufficiently “independent of Congress,” in a way that mimics—
and may even surpass—the independence of the federal 
Executive Branch.155 While Professors Hills and Weiser promote 
an autonomy-based approach to cooperative federalism,156 
Professor Bulman-Pozen espouses an agency-based approach.157 
More specifically, she explains how states charged with 
implementing federal programs may “diverge from federal 
executive policy, curb the federal executive’s own implementation 
of the law, or goad the federal executive to take particular 
actions.”158  
My cross-dimensional approach to administrative federalism 
complements these scholars’ work but stands apart. First, 
                                                                                                     
states can check Executive power). 
 153. See Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 151, at 186, 190–91 
(discussing how Congress can control Executive power through regulating 
agencies); Weiser, supra note 91, at 716–18 (“For the [separation-of-powers] 
functionalist, the involvement of state agencies might well be [an] appealing . . . 
innovative structural solution to address the challenge of keeping executive 
authority in check.”); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The 
Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ 
Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (1999) (“[I]ntergovernmental competition is 
useful, because it allows Congress to bypass nonfederal officials who fail to 
implement federal policy faithfully and instead to delegate power to other 
nonfederal officials who demonstrate greater fidelity to federal policies.”). 
 154. Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 151, at 190; accord Weiser, 
supra note 91, at 716–18 (discussing functionalist and formalist justifications 
and their effects on federalism). 
 155. See Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 151, at 186, 190–91. 
 156. See id. at 181–82; Weiser, supra note 91, at 663. 
 157. See Bulman-Pozen, Safeguard, supra note 135, at 459 (introducing her 
agency-based approach to cooperative federalism). 
 158. Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
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administrative federalism casts a wider net. Unlike cooperative 
federalism, administrative federalism extends to contexts where 
states are implementing state—not just federal—programs.159 
Second, as shown below, administrative federalism incorporates 
and leverages administrative law in ways that cross-dimensional 
treatments of cooperative federalism have not.160 Finally, the 
institutional audience is different. The cross-dimensional 
treatments of cooperative federalism have mostly (though not 
exclusively) been directed at how Congress might structure 
cooperative programs to advance separation-of-powers values. 
Administrative federalism, by contrast, primarily (though not 
exclusively) features a set of doctrinal proposals, which makes 
courts the primary institutional audience.161 
Gillian Metzger, Catherine Sharkey, and Miriam Seifter 
(writing separately) have also advanced ideas that relate to the 
project at hand. Descriptively, Professor Metzger explains that 
some of the Court’s recent federalism decisions—particularly on 
questions of preemption—“seem to treat the preservation of state 
authority . . . as an important mechanism for guarding against 
                                                                                                     
 159. See infra Part III (discussing the role of states in administrative 
federalism).  
 160. See infra Part IV (discussing how existing features of administrative 
law might be leveraged and tweaked to promote federalism and separation of 
powers, simultaneously).  
 161. As discussed infra Part V.B, the development of administrative 
federalism also includes a set of proposals of institutional redesign directed at 
Congress, the President, and agencies. See Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 
127, at 2173–78 (offering some suggestions); Sharkey, Inside Preemption, supra 
note 18 (same). But these non-doctrinal proposals tend to be secondary, if only 
because they have tended to fall on deaf ears in the past, and, in any event, are 
not likely to make a significant difference without judicial enforcement. Cf. 
Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127, at 2130, 2173. By contrast, the Court, 
of late, seems quite interested in questions of administrative federalism. See 
generally Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2 (discussing recent judicial 
developments that may reflect a concerted effort by the Court to reform agency 
performance through doctrine); see also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of 
the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. 
CT. REV. 253, 281 [hereinafter Young, Ordinary Diet of the Law] (noting that the 
Court probably has not “come to rest on the complicated cluster of issues 
surrounding preemption by federal administrative agencies”). 
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agency failure.”162 Prescriptively, Professor Sharkey has argued 
that administrative preemption doctrine can be shaped to 
improve how agencies make decisions about whether to preempt 
state law.163 While their emphasis is on how federalism doctrine 
can respond to agency failure in general, or in respect to making 
administrative preemption decisions more specifically,164 my 
project takes matters one step further. Namely, it explores how 
federalism-inspired changes to the regulatory process may 
derivatively affect separation-of-powers norms.165  
Meanwhile, Professor Seifter explores what enhancing “state 
voice” in the administrative arena portends for models of 
administrative legitimacy.166 Among other things, she claims that 
state voice may enhance state autonomy at the cost of 
administrative “expertise” and “political accountability,”167 and 
thus “in tension with the way we legitimize the bureaucracy.”168 
Some of Professor Seifter’s insights translate here, insofar as 
administrative legitimacy may depend upon separation of powers 
within and around the administrative state. After all, 
administrative expertise is a critical element of internal 
separation of powers; meanwhile, political accountability is a 
critical element of external separation of powers.169 Thus, insofar 
as state voice in the administrative arena may implicate 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 3–5; see also id. at 9–34 
(advancing this claim through the lens of Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 
538 (2008), Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), and Cuomo v. Clearinghouse 
Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)).  
 163. See Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127. 
 164. See id. at 2130, 2174; Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 17. 
 165. See infra Part IV. 
 166. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 449–50 (“The principal project of 
this Article is to reveal and explain the tension between existing understandings 
of administrative legitimacy and special state access to the federal regulatory 
process.”). 
 167. See id. at 482–87, 491–96 (noting that increased state involvement 
endangers accountability and administrative expertise). 
 168. Id. at 447–48.  
 169. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text (discussing internal-and 
external-models of checks-and-balances).  
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administrative expertise and accountability, state voice will also 
implicates separation(s) of powers. 
III. States in the Administrative State 
Champions of administrative federalism generally look to a 
collection of judicial doctrines, legal instruments, and 
institutional arrangements to bolster claims about the 
administrative system’s capacity to (1) “heed state regulatory 
interests”;170 (2) “protect the ability of states to exercise 
meaningful regulatory power”;171  (3) advance and preserve 
national interests;172 or (4) all of the above.173 This Part provides 
a descriptive account of the existing arrangements and legal 
doctrines for state interests in the administrative forum. More 
specifically, Subpart A discusses “state voice” in administrative 
policymaking. Subpart B addresses “state autonomy,” with an 
emphasis on the Court’s existing approach to administrative 
preemption. Academic proposals to reform the existing system 
will be taken up in Part IV.  
A. State Voice 
State and agency officials generally interact in one of two 
ways. First, each state may separately express its regulatory 
preferences to the relevant agency concerning a given issue or set 
of issues.174 Second, state officials from multiple—or all—
jurisdictions join together in state-lobbying groups to express a 
                                                                                                     
 170. Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127, at 2147–48. 
 171. Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2026 n.4. 
 172. See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 127 (promoting a nationalist 
over a state-based view of administrative federalism). 
 173. Cf. Seifter, Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 957, 980–81 (noting the 
multiple, and sometimes competing, goals of administrative federalism 
advanced in the literature).  
 174. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT 
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 20–21 (2009) (discussing the ways 
state governments act to protect their interests). 
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collective “state” view on regulatory matters. These 
intergovernmental groups—such as the National Governors 
Association, National Conference of State Legislators, and 
National League of Cities175—are now key players in the 
administrative forum as a result of longstanding practice and 
legal instruments.176 
Some legal instruments are subject specific. For instance, 
some statutes direct agencies to consult with states or 
intergovernmental groups on specific issues.177 Meanwhile, other 
legal instruments are trans-substantive.178 Most notably, 
Executive Order 13,132 was promulgated with the stated purpose 
of “ensur[ing] that the principles of federalism established by the 
Framers guide the executive departments and agencies in the 
formulation and implementation of policies.”179 Among other 
things, this Order requires federal agencies to: (1) consult with 
states before taking action that might restrict states’ policy 
options; (2) take such actions only when clear constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 175. See About, NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nga.org/ 
cms/about (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“[G]overnors identify priority issues and 
deal collectively with matters of public policy and governance at the state and 
national levels.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); About Us, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Our mission is to . . . ensure state legislatures a 
strong, cohesive voice in the federal system.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Influence Federal Policy, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, 
http://www.nlc.org/influence-federal-policy (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) 
(describing NLC’s efforts to shape federal policy for the benefit of municipalities) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 176. For in depth treatments of the intergovernmental lobby’s role in 
administrative governance, see generally NUGENT, supra note 174; Seifter, 
Interest Groups, supra note 114. 
 177. A recent example is the Affordable Care Act, which directs the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)—a state-interest group 
comprised of elected or appointed insurance commissioners from each state—to 
“establish” definitions and methodologies for several key provisions, subject to 
“certification” by HHS. See Seifter, Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 972–73 
(discussing this development).  
 178. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 
1999) (applying this Executive Order to all agencies except independent 
agencies, which are merely “encouraged to comply”). 
 179. Id. 
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authority exists and the problem is of national scope; and 
(3) “provide all affected State and local officials notice and an 
opportunity for appropriate participation” in administrative 
rulemakings.180 
These and other legal arrangements afford states privileged 
access to administrative policymaking. However, whether this 
access to administrative decisionmaking cashes out as an effective 
voice is a different matter.181 Anecdotes and hypotheses suggest 
that states do, in fact, have significant influence in shaping 
administrative policy.182 But this has been difficult to quantify 
empirically.183 Meanwhile, studies show that agencies generally 
do not comply with the consulting and reporting requirements of 
Executive Order 13,132,184 which by its express terms is not 
judicially enforceable.185  
                                                                                                     
 180. Id. at 43, 255–56. 
 181. See Seifter, Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 953. 
 182. See, e.g., Metzger, Federalism, supra note 128, at 567, 578–79 
(discussing the states’ role in affecting the Affordable Care Act); Sharkey, Inside 
Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 521, 569 (noting the effect states had on 
administrative policies, including those of the Department of Transportation 
and Environmental Protection Agency); Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 446–
47 (discussing states’ effect on administrative rulemaking generally); Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back, supra note 78, at 285 (“The influence of this 
‘intergovernmental lobby’ is, in fact, widely acknowledged and respected in 
Washington.”). 
 183. See Seifter, Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 971 (“Measuring 
interest group influence is well-recognized to be difficult in any particular 
circumstance, and making generalizations about groups’ influence is even more 
fraught.”). 
 184. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
737, 773 (2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption] (laying the 
empirical groundwork to show that Executive Order 13,132 is mostly honored in 
the breach); Sharkey, Accountablity, supra note 127, at 2138–39 (corroborating 
this view). 
 185. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999) 
(stating that the Executive Order “is intended only to improve the internal 
management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the 
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person”). 
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In any event, champions of the autonomy-model of federalism 
may take little comfort in state voice alone.186 Indeed, without 
advancing at least some conception of state autonomy, 
administrative federalism may not be federalism at all. 
B. State Autonomy 
When it comes to state autonomy, the subject of preemption 
takes center stage.187 For its part, the Court has recently 
expressed great interest in two related administrative 
preemption issues.188 The first concerns whether, and under what 
circumstances, agencies (rather than Congress) may preempt 
state law.189 The second concerns whether, and under what 
circumstances, the Court should defer to an agency’s view that 
Congress intends to preempt state law.190 
Under the Court’s existing doctrine, agency action with the 
“force of law” qualifies under the Supremacy Clause’s auspice of 
“Laws . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution],”191 and 
therefore preempts state law in the same way that federal 
statutes do.192 For example, an agency may pass a regulation that 
                                                                                                     
 186. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy-
model of federalism).  
 187. See generally, e.g., Young, Ordinary Diet of the Law, supra note 161, at 
253 (addressing statutory preemption and its implications for federalism). 
 188. See id. at 280, 281 (noting that the Court probably has not “come to rest 
on the complicated cluster of issues surrounding preemption by federal 
administrative agencies”). 
 189. See id. at 278 (discussing the ways in which agencies preempt, or 
attempt to preempt, state law). 
 190. Cf. Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 17 n.64 (“The question of 
whether courts should defer to agency views of preemptive effect contained in 
agency regulations that have the force of law is distinct from the question of 
whether substantive requirements contained in such regulations have 
preemptive effect.”). 
 191. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (laying out the Supremacy Clause); Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding that agency regulation 
conflict-preempted state law). 
 192. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1147–51 
(discussing the Court’s administrative preemption taxonomy in detail). 
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expressly preempts state law, thereby ousting states from 
regulating on the same subject or in the same field.193 An agency 
regulation can also preempt conflicting state law.194  
Although the Court has said that agency action with the 
“force of law” qualifies for preemptive effect,195 the import of this 
mantra is not entirely clear or consistent. First, the procedural 
hurdles associated with administrative notice-and-comment 
rulemaking196 are not prerequisites for preemption under the 
Court’s existing doctrine. The Court has held, for example, that 
administrative adjudicative orders qualify for preemptive 
effect.197 Moreover, although the Court’s doctrine is still 
developing on this point, even nonbinding administrative 
policies—which do not have the “force of law”—might qualify for 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause.198  
*    *    * 
                                                                                                     
 193. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 69 (1988). 
 194. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 867–68 (holding that a regulation 
concerning passive restraints in automobiles impliedly preempted a state tort 
law claim); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 674–75 (1993) 
(holding that a regulation governing train speed preempted a common law 
negligence claim); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 
170 (1982) (holding that a regulation permitting federally chartered banks to 
exercise the due-on-sale clause of mortgages preempts a contrary state common 
law rule). 
 195. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 864–65 (allowing an agency rule to preempt 
state law). 
 196. For useful summaries of these procedures, see Kristin E. Hickman, 
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 473–75 (2013); Seidenfeld, 
Role of Politics, supra note 62, at 1426–29; see also infra notes 266–271 and 
accompanying text (discussing notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 197.  See, e.g., Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 49–
50 (2003) (holding that state utility order regarding the allocation of wholesale 
power was preempted by an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 
(1986) (similar). 
 198. See Altria v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 88–90 (2008) (leaving open the question 
of whether an agency’s policy without the force of law can have preemptive 
effect); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (sending mixed signals 
on whether the Executive’s nonbinding enforcement priorities have preemptive 
effect); see also Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16, at 280–81 (discussing some 
of the mixed signals in the case).  
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The foregoing discussion sketched the existing arrangements 
and judicial doctrines concerning administrative federalism. 
Views differ on whether the administrative system, as is, 
adequately accounts for state interests.199 But most see room for 
improvement.200 The discussion below turns to the major 
academic proposals on the table.  
IV. What Administrative Federalism Can Do for Federalism(s) 
and Separation(s) of Powers 
This Part compares and contrasts the array of administrative 
federalism proposals advanced in the literature. But, unlike 
existing academic treatments, here I evaluate what each proposal 
may simultaneously entail for federalism(s) and separation(s) of 
powers. Before proceeding, however, a number of caveats are in 
order, which will also help to frame the project ahead.  
First, no one suggests that administrative federalism will 
return us to the Founders’ original design.201 Rather, the 
discourse tends to focus on how the administrative system can 
hold true to some federalist ideal in ways that still account for 
today’s political, social, and economic realities.202 Mostly in mind 
is a reconstituted, process-based approach to federalism. In a 
similar vein, I do not mean to suggest that reforming 
administrative federalism can return us to some originalist, or 
                                                                                                     
 199. Compare, e.g., Joshua Hawkes & Mark Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of 
Administrative Preemption, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 63, 81 (2014) (arguing that 
state interests, and federalism more generally, are adequately safeguarded 
through administrative processes) with Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16, at 
323–26 (arguing that administrative preemption is an affront to the political 
and procedural safeguards of federalism), and Young, Executive Preemption, 
supra note 129 (advancing a similar view).  
 200. See infra Part IV (discussing a number of proposals for administrative 
federalism and collecting sources). 
 201. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 2, at 2112 (“It is a truism that the 
founders’ world is not ours, and the problems confronting our polity, although 
not necessarily more difficult, are in many ways different.”). 
 202. See id. at 2112–13 (discussing previous articles that entertain 
arguments that modern administrative agencies foster democratic values 
through their treatment of federalism concerns).  
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formalistic, separation-of-powers ideal. Rather, in mind are more 
functional conceptions of separation of powers, some of which 
favor more separateness and inter-branch checking than others, 
but none of which insist on separation-of-powers purity. 
Second, and relatedly, this project takes the idea of 
“structural pluralism” seriously.203 Thus, I am not concerned with 
whether a particular administrative federalism proposal will 
deliver “more” or “less” federalism, or “more” or “less” separation 
of powers. Those inflections have no purchase here. Rather, the 
questions are whether, and how, a particular proposal might 
advance or undermine particular conceptions of federalism(s) and 
separation(s) of powers.204  
Third, federalism and separation of powers are not 
commensurate units that can be neatly weighed against each 
other. Quite to the contrary, federalism and separation of powers 
are value-laden concepts, each with their own intractable 
tensions. Thus, approaching administrative federalism through a 
separation-of-powers lens might facilitate decisions about 
particular proposals for reform, or it might complicate those 
decisions. For example, those who favor a particular 
administrative federalism proposal on federalism and separation-
of-powers grounds can take comfort in doubly favoring that 
proposal. Likewise, those who disfavor the federalism and 
                                                                                                     
 203. See supra Part II (sketching a number of competing and somewhat 
overlapping conceptions of separation(s) of powers, on the one hand, and 
federalism(s), on the other). 
 204. I reserve for future consideration whether particular types of 
federalism(s) are categorically better suited to advancing certain types of 
separation(s) of powers. Understanding and identifying those relationships, if 
they exist, might profitably advance the type of cross-dimensional evaluation 
presented here. But they are not necessary for the discussion and uncertain 
enough to warrant a deeper study than I can hope to provide here. A 
sovereignty-model of federalism, for instance, may be wildly incompatible with a 
separation-of-powers model that relies on internal checks for administrative 
legitimacy. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (discussing the 
sovereignty-model); supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text (discussing 
internal checks-and-balances). But whether, for example, process federalism 
will always advance a separation-of-powers model that favors external checks on 
agency action (over internal checks) may be a harder claim to sustain. See supra 
notes 88–117 and accompanying text (discussing process federalism); supra 
notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing external checks-and-balances). 
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separation-of-powers effects of a particular proposal can doubly 
disfavor it. Meanwhile, those with mixed views will face more 
difficult choices about how to weigh their federalism preferences 
against their separation-of-powers preferences. But critically, the 
fact that one’s preferences for federalism and separation of 
powers cannot easily be reconciled does not eliminate the need for 
that reconciliation. This, in a nutshell, is the whole point of 
approaching administrative federalism through a cross-
dimensional lens: it may make some decisions easier, or it may 
make what at first seemed like easy decisions much harder. In 
either event, however, this Article’s approach is to make those 
decisions more informed.  
Making those choices is beyond the scope of this project, with 
one important excpetion. Specifically, my analysis takes, as 
given, the conventional view that the Court can and should play 
an active role in the project of administrative federalism.205 As 
will be discussed, many of the proposals for administrative 
federalism envision the Court as a supporting player—to check 
specific agency actions, but more so as the progenitor of doctrines 
designed to stimulate different dynamics within and around the 
administrative state.206 Insofar as the Court (rather than 
Congress or the President) will be the federal branch giving 
states greater protection in and around the administrative arena, 
separation of powers is implicated.207 Many of the doctrinal 
proposals considered here are designed to channel more 
federalism decisions to Congress, or facilitate greater political 
oversight of agency action. In those regards, at least, the Court’s 
doctrinal role may support the separation of powers. But, for 
those who believe on separation-of-powers grounds that only 
Congress (and not the Court) should be making decisions bearing 
on federalism, this Article makes a tradeoff: administrative 
                                                                                                     
 205. See infra Part IV.A (discussing a number of doctrinal proposals for 
administrative preemption).   
206. Id. 
 207 See Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 74 (noting the “separation 
of powers implications” when the Court, as opposed to Congress, assigns “states 
a special agency policing role, and observing that an approach to agency reform 
that “focused more centrally on Congress would at least mitigate many of the[] 
concerns about judicial overstepping.”).  
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federalism needs the Court more than separation of powers needs 
the Court to sit idly by. I don’t foresee this tradeoff as being 
controversial, which is why I take some comfort in making it 
here. No one, to my knowledge, has argued that the Court has no 
role to play in shaping administrative federalism (despite deep 
disagreements over which doctrines the Court should adopt or 
maintain toward that end).208  
Finally, this Article is a first pass at teasing out the 
separation(s) of powers in administrative federalism. I fully 
expect—and, indeed encourage—other views about how 
particular administrative federalism proposals may implicate 
separation of powers in ways that I may overlook or give 
insufficient heed to here. This recognition, however, only speaks 
to the importance of the project: as is, we hazard making 
decisions about administrative federalism without accounting for 
separation of powers at all. 
Subpart A, below, offers a cross-dimensional evaluation of 
the proposals for administrative preemption. Subpart B takes a 
similar approach for state voice. Subpart C concludes with some 
additional thoughts about the values of approaching 
administrative federalism cross-dimensionally and the challenges 
ahead.  
A. Administrative Preemption 
Scholars have suggested a mix of proposals that would 
modify, in one or more ways, the Court’s current approach to 
administrative preemption. These proposals may be grouped into 
four categories: (1) eliminating administrative preemption;209 
                                                                                                     
 208. Gillian Metzger flags this separation-of-powers issue, at least as it 
relates to the Court’s approach to state standing as a means toward facilitating 
state checks on agency action. See id. But, elsewhere, she expresses her belief 
that courts should play a role in preserving and promoting federalism in the 
administrative state. See, e.g., Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 
2100 (claiming that “the Court should apply administrative law doctrines with 
an eye toward reinforcing agency attentiveness to state interests in regulatory 
autonomy”). The question, again, is how best to do so.  
 209. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1129–31 
(arguing that many of the problems associated with administrative federalism 
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(2) requiring that Congress clearly delegate preemption authority 
as a prerequisite to administrative preemption;210 (3) requiring 
that agencies employ certain procedures before preempting state 
law;211 and (4) ramping up judicial review of administrative 
preemption decisions.212 
                                                                                                     
can be alleviated by simply foreclosing administrative preemption); cf. Young, 
Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 896–97 (arguing that foreclosing 
administrative preemption is probably most in keeping with the political and 
procedural safeguards, but also noting that it is “probably too late in the day to 
insist” on it).  
 210. See, e.g., William Funk, Preemption by Federal Agency Action, in 
PREEMPTIVE CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE 
QUESTION 230–31 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008) (arguing in favor of a clear 
statement restriction that would require Congress to clearly manifest its intent 
to delegate preemption authority); Mendelson, Presumption Against, supra note 
129, at 698 (same); Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, supra note 
129, at 760 (“Agencies can preempt state law on their own authority only insofar 
as Congress has expressly delegated to them the authority to do so.”); Young, 
Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 897–98 (“We might insist that, in order 
to take action with the effect of preempting state law, the agency be exercising 
authority delegated by Congress with a heightened degree of clarity, . . . [or] we 
might instead insist that any independent preemptive authority must be clearly 
delegated to the agency by Congress.”).  
 211. See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 2002 (“[A] significant 
factor at play in the decision to permit agencies to expand federal power . . . [is] 
the need for more information. This factor is tied closely to the 
considerations . . . on agency procedure.”); Merrill, Preemption and Institutional 
Choice, supra note 129, at 776 (“Such a differentiation [between preempting 
action and non-preempting action] would be designed to give further 
encouragement to agencies to use more consultative procedures like notice and 
comment rulemaking in addressing preemption questions.”); Metzger, 
Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2029 (arguing that certain features of 
administrative law “hold strong to protect state interests,” including “notice-
and-comment rulemaking,” and the judicially imposed requirement that 
agencies engage in “reasoned decisionmaking”).  
 212. See William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory 
Interaction and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2009) (“[P]olicy and factual judgments underpinning 
preemption should be given a ‘hard look.’ Indeed, when one looks at the 
rationales for more rigorous modes of judicial review, virtually all are triggered 
by these recent agency preemption claims.”); William Funk, Judicial Deference 
and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1233, 1234 
(2010) (suggesting “how courts should assess claims of preemption of state law 
associated with federal agency regulations”); Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door 
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It is well understood that these proposals slant, in different 
ways and degrees, toward some conception of federalism.213 
Overlooked until now, however, is how these same proposals can 
indirectly affect separation(s) of powers—also in different ways 
and degrees. 
These “horizontal derivatives,” as I call them, come in two 
varieties: the first relates to how the federal branches interact 
among each other when making decisions about preemption; the 
second relates to how federal substantive decisions are made. In 
short, administrative-preemption doctrine can affect not only how 
federal preemption decisions are made but also, to various 
extents, how run-of-the-mill federal policy is made.214 As 
                                                                                                     
to “Hard-Look” Review of Agency Preemption, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 355–
56 (2009) (“[I]f the source of the preemption is the agency, rigorous judicial 
review becomes a necessary safeguard for federalism concerns.”); Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, supra note 184, at 741 (arguing that Chevron 
deference to agency’s determination of its own preemptive effect is 
inappropriate); Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2071 (“The 
Chevron focus additionally means that the administrative preemption debate 
centers on judicial review.”). But cf. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 641–46 (2014) (eschewing special deference doctrines for 
administration preemption decisions).  
 213. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1127 
(“[A]dministrative supremacy threatens the values of federalism.”); Mendelson, 
Presumption Against, supra note 129, at 698 (“[A]gencies lack both institutional 
expertise on important issues of state autonomy and federalism.”); Galle & 
Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 1933 (“This Article critiques the practice of 
limiting federal agency authority in the name of federalism.”); Metzger, 
Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2109 (“[T]he future of federalism lies in 
integrating protections for states into agency deliberations and judicial review of 
agency action.”). 
 214. Gillian Metzger, Catherine Sharkey, and Miriam Seifter (writing 
separately) have advanced related, but separate, ideas to the one advanced here. 
Metzger has argued that some of the Court’s recent federalism decisions—
particularly on questions of preemption—“seem to treat the preservation of 
state authority . . . as an important mechanism for guarding against federal 
agency failure.” See Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 5. In a similar 
vein, Professor Sharkey has argued that administrative preemption doctrine can 
be shaped to improve how agencies make decisions about whether to preempt 
state law. Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127. While their emphasis is on 
improving the regulatory process either generally or in respect to making 
administrative preemption decisions, see Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 
127, at 2130, 2174; Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 17, my attention is 
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developed below, these horizontal derivatives may provide an 
additional reason to favor or disfavor a particular administrative 
federalism proposal relative to others.  
1. Eliminating Administrative Preemption 
a. For Federalism  
In other writing, I have argued that Congress’s ability to 
freely “delegate supremacy” to agencies is an affront to the 
political and procedural safeguard theories of federalism.215 
Federal legislation is purposefully difficult.216 To become federal 
“Law,” a statutory proposal must survive the constitutional rigors 
of bicameralism and presentment.217 And, along the way, 
statutory proposals must also survive the subconstitutional 
“vetogates” erected by the rules and customs of both chambers of 
Congress, such as the filibuster.218 Allowing agencies to preempt 
state law based on nothing more than a general delegation of 
policymaking discretion circumvents the political and procedural 
                                                                                                     
directed to how changes in the regulatory process may derivatively affect 
separation-of-powers norms. See infra Part IV. Meanwhile, Professor Seifter 
explores what state voice—especially as transmitted through state-interest 
groups—portends for models of administrative legitimacy. Seifter, States, supra 
note 116. Some of her insights pertain here, insofar as administrative legitimacy 
may depend upon separation of powers within and around the administrative 
state. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Seifter’s work and how it relates to 
separation of powers). 
 215. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1163; 
Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16, at 323–26. 
 216. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1163; 
Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1338–39 (discussing how the 
“precise lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitution” safeguard 
federalism by making the legislative process difficult).  
 217. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (“Every bill which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be 
presented to the President of the United States.”). 
 218. For discussions on how the legislative vetogates operate, see William N. 
Eskridge Jr. & John A. Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 
523, 528–33 (1992) (describing the legislative process as a game in which 
agencies have altered how the game is played). 
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safeguards that states would otherwise enjoy in the legislative 
process.219 
As compared to the Court’s existing doctrine, eliminating the 
possibility of administrative preemption would siphon more 
preemption decisions to Congress.220 In turn, states may protect 
themselves legislatively by blocking or shaping Congress’s 
decision to oust state law.221 Further, foreclosing administrative 
preemption would promote state autonomy even when Congress 
does not expressly engage the preemption question in a statutory 
provision.222 Under the Court’s implied-preemption doctrine, 
Congress (or, for that matter, agencies) need not actually make 
an express preemption decision for its laws (or, administrative 
actions) to trump: preemption occurs if a sufficient conflict exists 
between the federal and state policy.223 Eliminating the outlet of 
administrative preemption, however, would ensure that only 
Congress’s statutes (and not administrative policies) can serve as 
the basis for that preemptive conflict.224 The likely result is less 
                                                                                                     
 219. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1160, 1163 
(listing the ability of an agency to bypass the bicameral process and circumvent 
the political and procedural safeguards in that process as a problem with 
administrative supremacy). 
 220. See id. at 1163–82 (discussing the implications of channeling 
preemption decisions to Congress).  
 221. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 2, at 2115 (“[C]onventional wisdom 
holds that the states retain some measure of protection by way of the procedural 
and political safeguards of federalism.”); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, 
and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1202 (2001) (arguing that 
congressional representatives are accountable to their state constituencies in 
federalism determinations). 
 222. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981–85 (2011) 
(reiterating that the Court’s implied-preemption analysis applies regardless of 
whether Congress directly addressed the question of preemption in an express 
preemption or savings provision).  
 223. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(discussing the Court’s implied-preemption doctrine). 
 224. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1165 
(discussing the substantive implications of eliminating administrative 
preemption, such as allowing only Congress to preempt state law through “duly 
enacted statutes”); Clark, Constitutional Compromise, supra note 145, at 1422 
(arguing that “governance prerogatives of the states” were meant to be protected 
by the difficulty of enacting federal law); Mendelson, Presumption Against, 
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qualifying federal conflicts and thus less displacement of state 
law.225  
The federalism contest over this proposal is whether it 
pushes too far in favor of state autonomy at the expense of 
nationalist interests. Mark Seidenfeld and Joshua Hawkes, for 
example, argue that foreclosing administrative preemption would 
improvidently sacrifice the institutional competencies that 
agencies bring to the preemption calculus, such as flexibility, 
expertise, and accountability, among others.226 I, for one, do not 
think so for reasons explained elsewhere.227 But the point, for 
present purposes, is that reasonable minds will differ on whether 
foreclosing administrative preemption leans too heavily in favor 
of state autonomy, or too heavily against nationalism. 
While critically important, this federalism dispute should not 
monopolize the conversation. We should also consult what 
foreclosing administrative preemption might entail for 
separation(s) of powers.  
b. For Separation of Powers 
Eliminating administrative preemption could deliver both 
types of horizontal derivatives outlined above concerning how 
(1) express preemption and (2) substantive (i.e., non-preemption) 
federal policies are made.  
                                                                                                     
supra note 129, at 717 (“[T]he presumption against preemption is to ensure that 
states and the federal government participate in a real dialogue over whether 
state law should yield to federal law.”). 
 225. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1160 
(discussing how administrative preemption has increased the number of 
federal–state conflicts due to the sheer volume of agency rulemaking).  
 226. See Hawkes & Seidenfeld, supra note 199, at 91–102; see also Galle & 
Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 2021–22 (arguing generally that agencies should 
be able to preempt state law, in part, because they are best positioned 
institutionally to make preemption decisions). 
 227. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1183–88 
(explaining how agencies can use their expertise to nudge Congress to decide 
preemption questions; how agencies are less politically accountable than 
Congress; and how administrative efficiency and flexibility are reasons to worry 
about, not applaud, administrative preemption). 
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First—and most obviously—foreclosing Congress’s ability to 
delegate preemption authority would limit the scope of what 
Congress could delegate. To be clear, Congress could still delegate 
general policymaking, for example, to the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Consumer Protection Board, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and so on. But Congress could not delegate 
the decision or power to displace state law.228 Thus, in the event 
of a conflict between an administrative policy and state law, the 
administrative policy would not trump.229 Rather, Congress 
would have to make the decision to preempt by statute, either ex 
ante in anticipation of federal–state conflicts or ex post in 
response to regulatory conflicts as they arise.230 In either event, 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1129 
(“Congress’s well-entrenched authority to delegate policymaking to agencies is 
conceptually severable from the more limited and undertheorized power to 
delegate supremacy.”).  
 229. For a discussion and normative defense of the implications of this 
result, see id. at 1170–76 (describing the costs and benefits of federal–state 
regulatory overlap when administrative policy does not preempt state law). For 
a critical response, see Hawkes & Seidenfeld, supra note 199, at 77–83.   
 230. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1179–80 
(“Foreclosing delegated supremacy may . . . foster ex ante preemption 
decisions. . . . [a]nd may also be expected to have positive effects on Congress’s 
ex post preemption decisions.”). Hawkes and Seidenfeld are wrong to suggest 
that foreclosing administrative preemption is the equivalent of the legislative-
negative proposal that was ultimately defeated in the Constitutional 
Convention. Hawkes & Seidenfeld, supra note 199, at 78. Most importantly, 
Congress can, and does, preempt state law ex ante. Moreover, foreclosing 
administrative preemption might cause Congress to decide preemption 
questions ex ante more often, insofar as the outlet of administrative preemption 
would not be available. Further, Hawkes and Seidenfeld’s argument seems to 
assume that Congress categorically would want to preempt state law just 
because an agency might prefer to do so.  Put to the choice, however, Congress 
may prefer federal and state regulatory overlap on a particular issue, may 
prefer the conflicting state law over the federal policy, may prefer to see how the 
conflict works itself out, or may simply not have the political grist to overcome 
state resistance to an administrative policy because the country is torn on what 
the national policy—if any—should be. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 
supra note 129, at 1169–82; see also Christina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating 
Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2094, 2097 (2014) (“Though pursuit of their interests . . . may often lead to 
conflict, . . . the value of the system common to all of its participants is the 
framework it creates for the ongoing negotiation of disagreements . . . .”); id at 
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requiring Congress to make preemption decisions gives partial, 
but important, expression to the separation-of-powers maxim 
that Congress is federal lawmaker.231  
Second, foreclosing administrative preemption may provide 
Congress the political will to decide (rather than delegate) more 
matters of substantive policy. If agency action cannot preempt 
state law, and if Congress anticipates or wants a uniform 
national standard, then Congress will have to decide the content 
of that standard. To be clear, Congress would not have to make 
more decisions about the scope and content of federal policy than 
it currently does. Congress might simply have more reason to 
make those decisions if it wants or expects regulatory uniformity. 
In short, eliminating the outlet of administrative preemption 
would not only require Congress to make decisions about whether 
to preempt state law; it might also incentivize Congress to make 
more substantive regulatory decisions in the first place.  
Surely there is ample room to disagree about the virtues of 
these horizontal derivatives. Critics of the nondelegation maxim 
are likely to hold unfavorable views about the horizontal 
derivatives associated with foreclosing administrative 
preemption.232 For example, Peter Strauss worries that 
                                                                                                     
2100 (arguing that “‘national’ issues—those whose salience cuts across state 
lines and constituencies—are not always or necessarily best served by a federal 
monopoly”). 
 231. Of course, the Court has famously underenforced the principle that 
Congress cannot delegate lawmaking, allowing Congress to freely delegate 
policymaking. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, GEO. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the disconnect between the nondelegation 
maxim and a variety of the Court’s other administrative law doctrines). But cf. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329–37 (2000) 
(suggesting that the constitutional maxim that Congress cannot delegate 
lawmaking is now partially captured in a bundle of canons of statutory 
interpretation). Still, however, the Court outwardly insists that Congress cannot 
delegate lawmaking. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 n.4 
(2013) (noting that “under our constitutional structure” agency rules must be 
exercises of the “executive” power); Whitman v.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 472 (2001) (stating that Article I “permits no delegation of [legislative] 
powers”). 
 232. For criticism of the nondelegation maxim, see David B. Spence & Frank 
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 131–
33 (2000) (outlining and rebuking the constitutional case for nondelegation); 1 
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abandoning administrative preemption might also require 
abandoning the Court’s “delegation doctrine as we know it in any 
context implicating state law.”233 Meanwhile, those of the view 
that Congress should be making more decisions about regulatory 
policy may view these horizontal derivatives more favorably.234  
Again, my objective here is not to proclaim the winning 
position. Rather, it is to enable a more holistic evaluation of what 
this particular federalism proposal may entail, cross-laterally, for 
separation of powers.  
2. Clear-Statement Rule 
A competing proposal for administrative preemption would 
require, as a prerequisite, that Congress clearly delegate the 
power to displace state law.235 Under this approach—and 
contrary to the Court’s existing doctrine236—Congress’s general 
                                                                                                     
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.02, at 79 (1958) 
(insisting that the nondelegation doctrine is a judicial invention with no true 
constitutional character); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators 
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–98 (1985) 
(defending delegations as desirable for promoting public preferences and public 
welfare); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory 
in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (1985) (“The abstract appeal of 
the [nondelegation] doctrine vanishes rapidly . . . when it is tested in the 
crucible of reality.”). 
 233. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1567, 1591 (2008). I do think, however, that this concern is overstated. See 
Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1157–69 (arguing that 
eliminating administrative preemption would not awaken the sleeping 
nondelegation doctrine). 
 234. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 130–32 (1980) 
(discussing why much law is left to be made by unelected administrators and 
commenting that this is an undemocratic escape from accountability); MARTIN 
H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 141–43 (1995) (noting 
that the “broad legislative delegation to administrative agencies threatens to 
dilute the principle of electoral accountability” by removing policy choices from 
those who are most representative); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY (1993) (providing a scathing critique of congressional 
delegation).  
 235. See sources cited supra note 210. 
 236. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 
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delegation of policymaking to an agency would not qualify as an 
implicit delegation of the preemption power.237  
a. For Federalism 
By design, a clear-statement approach to administrative 
preemption aims to promote the political and the procedural 
safeguards of federalism and, thus, process federalism more 
generally. Politically, a clear-statement requirement could put 
interested parties on notice during the legislative process that 
Congress intends to delegate preemption authority.238 This notice, 
in turn, could provide preemption challengers an opportunity to 
shape or block Congress’s decision to delegate that decision.239 
Procedurally, a clear-statement requirement could also slow the 
pace and scope of administrative preemption, on the assumption 
that Congress will often fail to meet the political or drafting 
hurdles needed to express clearly its intent to delegate 
supremacy in a given case.240 When Congress does not or cannot 
                                                                                                     
153–54 (1982) (“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal 
statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his 
discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine 
whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.”).  
 237. See Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 886–89 (explaining 
how an ambiguous statute delegates policymaking decisions to an agency, but 
that “the further question of whether the federal statute preempts state law . . . 
is not a policy judgment within the agency’s expertise”).  
 238. See Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, supra note 129, at 
767 (“[A]n express delegation of authority to preempt. . . . would afford enhanced 
opportunities for the states and other interested parties to weigh in on the 
issue.”); Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 877 (“The effect of this 
clear statement rule is to ensure notice that state interests are threatened by 
proposed legislation . . . .”).  
 239. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1157–58 
(“One intended effect of this approach is to put interested parties on notice 
during the legislative process that Congress intends to delegate preemption 
authority.”); Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 898 (describing 
how the clear-statement rule would oblige Congress to make the preemption 
decision rather than leaving it to a court). 
 240. See Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 899 (discussing 
how a nondelegation canon raises the threshold for congressional delegations of 
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meet those challenges, states would be left room to regulate 
concurrently with agencies by default.241 
My own view is that a clear-statement rule would mark an 
improvement in the law. This proposal returns attention to 
Congress, at least at the threshold, by ensuring that Congress 
wants or expects an agency to make a preemption decision on a 
particular subject. Yet, as compared to eliminating 
administrative preemption, a clear-statement rule may concede 
too much.242 First, it assumes that Congress is constitutionally 
empowered to delegate the power of preemption.243 Beyond this 
formalistic concern, however, a clear-statement rule provides 
“only half-baked redress” for the political and procedural 
safeguards of federalism.244 When Congress delegates the 
preemption decision, its members can simply redirect any 
concerned constituents to the appropriate agency. That political 
deflection would not be possible if, instead, the preemption buck 
stopped with Congress.245 
Ultimately, whether a clear-statement rule bends too far in 
favor of state autonomy, or not far enough, largely depends on 
one’s normative predispositions. Those who favor a clear-
statement rule generally do so as a compensating adjustment—a 
necessary price to pay for Congress’s ability to delegate 
preemption authority and the Court’s general reluctance to police 
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.246 Others, however, 
                                                                                                     
authority that encroach on state autonomy).  
 241. See id. at 880. 
 242. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1157–58 
(discussing how a clear-statement rule would require Congress to deliberate and 
decide for itself to displace state law, but suggesting that such a rule is not 
enough). 
 243. See generally Rubenstein, Paradox, supra note 16 (challenging this 
assumption). 
 244. See Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, supra note 129, at 1158 
(“Requiring Congress to deliberate and decide whether to delegate supremacy 
offers states far less protection than requiring Congress to both deliberate and 
decide for itself to displace state law.” (emphasis added)). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1433 
(suggesting a clear-statement rule as a prerequisite to administrative field 
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disfavor a clear-statement rule as an untoward judicial intrusion 
upon legislative decisions, administrative decisions, or both.247 
Gillian Metzger argues, for example, that a clear-statement rule 
“would create extraordinary obstacles to federal administrative 
governance.”248 Professors Galle and Seidenfeld make a similar 
point, arguing that agencies have institutional advantages that 
make them good deciders of preemption even when Congress is 
silent.249 
b. For Separation of Powers 
Apart from its effect on federalism, a clear-statement rule 
could promote the separation-of-powers value of making Congress 
actually deliberate and decide to delegate supremacy.250 Again, 
this promotes the separation-of-powers principle that Congress is 
lawmaker. On the other hand, however, a judicially enforced 
requirement that Congress clearly express its intent could also 
serve to undermine the Congress-as-lawmaker principle. That 
disruption can occur, for instance, in case-specific contexts where 
Congress actually intends to delegate preemption but fails to say 
                                                                                                     
preemption); Mendelson, Presumption Against, supra note 129, at 723–24 
(listing the various benefits a clear-statement rule would provide for state 
interests); Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, supra note 129, at 759 
(“Whatever improvements [transferring broad authority to agencies] might 
bring in terms of pragmatic variables, it would disserve the cause of 
constitutional government.”); Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 
897–99 (discussing the practical implications of a clear-statement rule).  
 247. See Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 39–40 (discussing judicial 
opinions that describe the limits of federal court oversight of government 
administration). “[A]ccording to the Court, broad programmatic attack[s] 
inappropriately inject . . . [c]ourts into day-to-day agency management and risk 
judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements.” Id. (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 248. Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2072.  
 249. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 1948 (“[A]gencies are in 
many contexts better suited to consider federalism concerns than are Congress 
or the federal judiciary.”). 
 250. See Mendelson, Presumption Against, supra note 129, at 710 
(describing how a clear-statement rule “helps assure that legislative decisions to 
preempt are thoughtful and deliberate”).  
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so in clear enough terms to satisfy a reviewing court.251 In that 
case, the court might be substituting its judgment for Congress’s. 
Either way, the horizontal derivatives attaching to a clear-
statement rule are, by comparison, more modest than if 
administrative preemption were foreclosed. While a clear-
statement rule would make it more difficult for Congress to 
delegate supremacy, it would not prevent Congress from doing 
so.252 That horizontal modesty, for some, may be a reason to favor 
this proposal.  
Indeed, it may explain why Professor Clark seems to favor a 
clear-statement rule over an approach that would eliminate 
administrative preemption (although his writing has not 
expressly ruled out the latter possibility).253 On the one hand, 
foreclosing administrative preemption would seem to maximize 
the political and procedural safeguards of federalism—a result 
that, considered in isolation, Professor Clark certainly seems to 
favor.254 On the other hand, however, Professor Clark’s sensitivity 
to the Court’s existing nondelegation doctrine seems to lead him, 
more comfortably, in favor of a clear-statement rule.255 While a 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 2, at 2147–50 (discussing the 
Court’s “presumption against preemption” doctrine and requirement of being 
certain of Congressional intent).  
 252. See id. at 2148–49; see also Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 
129, at 901 (recognizing that it is difficult for Congress to predict potential 
conflicts and when an agency might need preemptive authority).  
 253. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1433 (suggesting a 
clear-statement rule as a prerequisite to administrative field-preemption).  
 254. Indeed, this is the overarching theme of his great body of work. See id. 
at 1438 (“Permitting agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities authoritatively 
not only negates the presumption against preemption, but effectively shifts the 
power to preempt state law away from Congress and the President to less 
accountable administrative agencies.”); Clark, Constitutional Compromise, 
supra note 145, at 1422 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause safeguards federalism by 
conditioning supremacy on adherence to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking 
procedures.”); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s modern view of the 
domestic effect of sole executive agreements appears to contradict the 
Supremacy Clause, constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures, and the 
political safeguards of federalism.”).  
 255. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 112, at 1375, 1433–34 
(suggesting that when Congress delegates policymaking power, it is effectively 
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clear-statement rule might not be his ideal federalism 
adjustment, more aggressive reforms along the federalism 
dimension (say, eliminating administrative preemption) might 
take him too far from his ideal along the separation-of-powers 
dimension. 
3. Limiting the Types of Qualifying Agency Action 
A third approach to administrative preemption would limit 
the types of agency action that could qualify for preemptive 
effect.256 Due to the combination of functions in agencies 
(legislative, judicial, and executive), agencies make policy in any 
number of forms.257 This, in turn, raises the issue of which forms 
should qualify for preemption under the Supremacy Clause.  
a. For Federalism 
As discussed in Part II, agency action with the “force of law” 
qualifies for preemptive effect under the Court’s existing 
doctrine.258 Included in this category are (1) agency policies 
promulgated pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
notice-and-comment rulemaking and (2) binding agency 
adjudications—both of which are discussed in more detail below. 
                                                                                                     
Congress that preempts state law, thus potentially alleviating any Supremacy 
Clause problem).  
 256. Cf. Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 901 (“What will not 
work . . . is for the Court to continue to pretend that every federal agency action 
is equivalent to a congressional statute for purposes of preemption analysis.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 257. See Gersen, supra note 11, at 305 (“The Supreme Court has described 
agencies’ functional authority as a mix of executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-
legislative.”). 
 258. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009) (“This Court has 
recognized that an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-empt 
conflicting state requirements.”); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (describing ordinary preemption principles as they 
“instruct us to read statutes as pre-empting state laws . . . that ‘actually conflict’ 
with the statute or federal standards promulgated thereunder” (quoting Fidelity 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
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Less clear, however, is whether other types of agency action 
qualify or should qualify. For example, still undecided is whether 
binding administrative rules that are exempt from notice-and-
comment procedures—such as rules promulgated under the APA’s 
“good cause” or “foreign affairs” exceptions259—can preempt state 
law.260 Moreover, the Court’s landmark decision in Arizona v. 
United States261 sent mixed signals on whether administrative 
enforcement policies (the product of neither rulemaking nor 
adjudicatory proceedings) could form the basis of a preemptive 
conflict.262 Faced with these uncertainties, scholars have pressed 
for clearer lines. But, as discussed below, disagreement persists 
over where to draw those lines.263 
                                                                                                     
 259. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012) (exempting matters relating to the 
military, foreign affairs, or public property from APA rulemaking requirements); 
id. § 553(b)(B) (providing a “good cause” exemption from notice-and-comment 
requirements). 
 260. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 2, at 2132–33 (asserting that 
administrative federalism raises questions about whether rules promulgated 
without notice-and-comment procedures can preempt state law).  
 261. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 262. See Eric Posner, The Imperial President of Arizona, SLATE (June 26, 
2012, 12:04 PM), http://perma.cc/6QH-AZC8 (last visited January 22, 2015) 
[hereinafter Posner, The Imperial President] (observing that the Arizona 
majority found certain provisions of S.B. 1070 preempted not because it conflicts 
with federal law, but because it conflicts with the President’s policy) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David. S. Rubenstein, Immigration 
Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (2013) 
(discussing how the Court sent mixed signals in Arizona on the question of 
whether, or to what extent, Arizona’s immigration policies were preempted by 
the agency’s enforcement policies or Congress’s statutes). 
 263. Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 899 (discussing 
limiting the scope of agency preemption powers in the same way deference is 
limited, which would not limit the ability of Congress to delegate preemptive 
authority, “but . . . insist that the agency actually exercise that authority” before 
preemption could be found).  
ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM  231 
(1) Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking  
Some scholars suggest making notice-and-comment 
proceedings the exclusive means of administrative preemption.264 
This proposal requires appreciation—and hence, a brief detour—
for what notice-and-comment rulemaking generally entails. This 
background will also be relevant later, where I will suggest how a 
notice-and-comment approach to preemption may affect 
separation(s) of powers.265  
As applied by the Court, the APA’s notice-and-comment 
procedure is demanding (though, to be sure, less demanding than 
the legislative process).266 First, the agency must provide advance 
notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and offer 
interested parties the opportunity to submit written comments in 
response.267 Moreover, to enable meaningful public comments, 
courts have required the agency to make its intentions clearly 
                                                                                                     
 264. See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 1939 (“[T]here are 
strong indications that agency actions, especially notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, are more transparent than congressional actions.”); Benjamin & 
Young, supra note 2, at 2133 (stating that many questions as to whether 
binding administrative rules exempt from notice-and-comment procedures can 
preempt state law assume a focus on agency, and asserting that the more 
foundational question lies with Congress). Presumably, these commentators 
would also include agency regulations promulgated pursuant to the more 
procedurally demanding requirements of so-called “formal” rulemaking. See 5 
U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012) (listing the statutory requirements for “formal” 
rulemaking). But these types of rulemakings are quite rare. See GARY S. 
LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 215 (2d ed. 2001) (“Apart from the few 
rulemaking statutes that contain an express ‘on the record’ requirement, formal 
rulemaking has virtually disappeared as a procedural category.”). 
 265. See infra notes 303–323 and accompanying text (discussing the notice-
and-comment approach to preemption in more detail).  
 266. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (discussing the “finely 
wrought” and cumbersome legislative requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 218, at 528–33 (discussing 
legislative vetogates).  
 267. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (stating the statutory notice-and-
comment requirements); see also Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 
227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition 
that studies upon which an agency relies in promulgating a rule must be made 
available during the rulemaking in order to afford interested persons 
meaningful notice and an opportunity for comment.”). 
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known in the notice of rulemaking.268 Further, because courts 
require that an agency’s final rule be a “logical outgrowth” of what 
the notice foreshadowed, the agency may not change an important 
aspect of a proposed rule without first providing an additional 
notice and opportunity for public comment.269 Finally, although the 
APA textually requires that a final regulation be accompanied by a 
“concise general statement of [the regulation’s] basis and 
purpose,”270 courts generally require the agency to respond to all 
significant comments received, which burdens the agency to 
explain its decisions rather thoroughly.271  
Apart from the foregoing, notice-and-comment rulemakings 
potentially trigger political and judicial oversight. For example, 
executive orders require that executive agencies report and seek 
approval of its regulations from the Office of Internal Regulatory 
Affairs, which is under the President’s supervision.272 And to the 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 
2002) (discussing the notice-and-comment requirements and that the final rule 
must not depart too much from the proposed rule); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 168 
F.3d 1344, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that local telephone companies were 
not deprived of notice that the FCC might use industry-wide averages in their 
evaluations). 
 269. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“But an 
unexpressed intention cannot convert a final rule into a ‘logical outgrowth’ that 
the public should have anticipated.”); Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical 
Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1996) 
(“Generally stated, if the final rule is found by the reviewing court to be the 
logical outgrowth of the proposed rule, it will find adequate notice . . . .”). 
 270. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).  
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 
252 (2d Cir. 1977) (“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital 
questions, raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely 
unanswered.”); see also Hickman, supra note 196, at 474 (explaining that, 
despite the text of § 553(c), that judicial requirements for explanation “[eschew] 
concision”). 
 272. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (providing that 
agencies must submit proposed agency regulation to OIRA). Every President 
since Ronald Reagan has had a policy of regulatory review. See Exec. Order No. 
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (President Reagan), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) 
(President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (President 
George W. Bush), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010); Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (President Obama); see also Nicholas 
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extent that the proposed rule may interfere with state 
prerogatives, Executive Order 13,132 instructs agencies to account 
for those federalism implications.273 Moreover, pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act, all agencies are required to submit 
proposed rules to Congress and the General Accounting Office 
before the rule can take effect.274 Meanwhile, the procedural 
hurdles of notice-and-comment rulemaking yield a fairly robust 
paper trail, which on judicial review enables courts to take a “hard 
look” at a rule’s substance and the agency’s decisional basis.275 
Finally, and more informally, the procedures inherent in notice-
and-comment rulemaking expand the class of interest groups and 
                                                                                                     
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1267 (2006) (stating Office of Management and Budget 
review “provides a sitting President, Democrat or Republican, with a powerful 
tool to promote his political agenda”); Kagan, supra note 61, at 2285–90 
(discussing President Clinton’s use of regulatory review). For a collection of the 
arguments over the President’s directive authority, see generally Robert V. 
Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over 
Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487 (2011). 
 273. See supra notes 178–186 and accompanying text (providing that federal 
agencies must consult with the states before taking action if that action would 
interfere with states’ policies). 
 274. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (requiring agencies to submit a report 
containing a copy of the rule, a general statement, and cost–benefit analysis of 
the rule, among other requirements). The CRA creates “an automatic process for 
generating legislative consideration of disapproval in every case of agency 
rulemaking, that brings all rules before Congress for review immediately upon 
their adoption.” Peter L. Strauss, Speech, From Expertise to Politics: The 
Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 768 
(1996). Although the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment for legislating are not circumvented by this procedure, the CRA 
eases Congress’s own rules, see 5 U.S.C. § 802, making it easier for overriding 
legislation to make it to the floor of each House of Congress for votes. See 
Beermann, supra note 62, at 84 (explaining that “[t]he main innovations of the 
CRA are procedural”). 
 275. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (discussing that hard look review requires an 
agency to articulate the reasoning behind its decision and the court must review 
the reasoning); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (providing that hard 
look doctrine requires agencies “to offer detailed, even encyclopedic, 
explanations” for agency actions). 
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entities participating in the decisionmaking process.276 These 
participants, in turn, can trigger “fire alarms” in the political 
branches, most notably Congress, if they are dissatisfied with the 
direction of anticipated agency action.277 These fire alarms offer 
Congress a cost-efficient way to monitor agencies and to intervene, 
if necessary, prior to the administrative policy taking hold.278  
In light of the foregoing, scholars who favor notice-and-
comment procedures as a prerequisite to administrative 
preemption generally do so for four related reasons: first, because 
“[t]he additional burdens imposed on the agency” can serve to slow 
or quash preemptive regulations;279 second, because these 
procedures provide states the best opportunity to have their 
viewpoints considered within the administrative forum;280 third, 
because of the potential for state-triggered “fire alarms” in 
Congress;281 and fourth, because, in the process of conducting 
                                                                                                     
 276. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 243, 244, 258 (1987) (discussing that notice-and-comment procedures 
permit an agency to determine “who[] the relevant political interests to the 
decision” are). 
 277. See id. at 244, 257–58 (arguing that rulemaking procedures give 
Congress and the President early warning of agency action). 
 278. See id. at 244, 258 (noting that agency rulemaking procedures provide 
political figures notice); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics 
in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1769 (2007) (providing that 
Congress “shifts to third parties the cost of gathering and processing 
information”). By contrast, judicial review generally requires that an agency 
action be final before it may be judicially challenged. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) 
(“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly 
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). 
Because of the deference that courts generally afford to the substance of agency 
decisions, derailing an anticipated administrative action politically is often a 
challenger’s best chance of redress. 
 279. Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 899. 
 280. See Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2058, 2084–85 
(providing that the procedures provide notice to states of potentially harmful 
agency action, and that many statutes provide a prerequisite of notification 
before agency action can “displace a state regulatory role”). 
 281. See Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory 
Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 647 (2010) 
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Who Decides] (noting that notice and comment permits 
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“hard look” review, a court can ensure that the agency adequately 
took state interests into account during the rulemaking process.282 
Collectively, these reasons are a partial nod to the political and 
procedural safeguards of federalism. Of course, the political and 
procedural protection that states receive through notice and 
comment is fundamentally different—in kind and degree—than 
what states would otherwise receive in the legislative forum.283 
However, notice-and-comment rulemaking provides states more 
procedural (and indirect political) protection than they generally 
receive through less formal modes of agency action.284  
(2) Other Agency Action: Administrative Adjudication and 
Nonbinding Policies 
Other scholars, however, would draw the preemption line 
elsewhere. For example, Thomas Merrill would add binding 
administrative adjudications to the class of qualifying preemptive 
action.285 The theory behind this proposal is that adjudications are 
binding on the parties to these proceedings.286  
                                                                                                     
interested parties to inform Congress if the rulemaking proceedings conflict 
with their interests); Metzger, Administrative Law, supra note 127, at 2087 
(noting that “by forcing an agency to provide notice of actions it plans to take, 
procedural requirements empower congressional oversight and thus reinforce 
such political safeguards as Congress has to offer”). 
 282. See Seidenfield, Who Decides, supra note 281, at 656 (“[F]ederal courts 
will be responsible for direct review of preemption rules.”); see also Sharkey, 
Accountability, supra note 127, at 2130 (arguing that hard-look review could 
help induce agencies to take state interests into account, as they are already 
required to do (but do not always do) under federalism executive orders).  
 283.  See Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 129, at 876–78 
(discussing that federal agencies “are clearly not designed to represent the 
interests of States” and can circumvent the political and procedural safeguards 
of federalism while Congress, in the legislative forum, cannot).  
 284. See id. at 899 (“Procedures such as notice and comment offer some 
opportunity for state governmental input into the rulemaking process, both 
directly and through federal representatives.”). 
 285. See Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, supra note 129, at 
763–67 (using “force of law” as a criteria for preemptive effect, in combination, 
however, with other limitations, including a clear-statement rule). 
 286. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. 
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Although adjudicative orders have the force of law, the 
procedures generally associated with agency adjudication are a far 
cry from the political- and procedural-safeguards theories of 
federalism (if that is even the goal). To begin with, states may not 
even be parties to an adjudication that is later found to have 
preemptive force, much less be aware that a potentially 
preemptive ajudication occurred. Moreover, even if agency orders 
are binding on the agency and adjudicating parties, the decisional 
policies that emerge from those adjudications bind neither third 
parties nor the agency in the same way that notice-and-comment 
rulemakings do.287 Indeed, an agency may choose to make policy 
via adjudication (rather than rulemaking) so that it can more 
flexibly change its position in a future adjudication should the 
need or desire arise.288 Thus, to the extent that a decisional policy 
                                                                                                     
CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2004) (“An order produced in administrative 
adjudication binds only the party to that proceeding . . . .”). 
 287. See William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, 
and the Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 362–63 (2000) 
(observing that “when an agency adjudicates, it need not confine itself to 
existing law”); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy, Annotation, Impact of 
Administrative Decisions, 2 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 5:67 (3d ed. 2014) (explaining 
that “[s]tare decisis is not the rule in administrative adjudications”); Texas v. 
United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) (“An agency . . . is not bound 
by the shackles of stare decisis to follow blindly the interpretations that it, or 
the courts of appeals, have adopted in the past.”); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 
394 U.S. 759, 765–66 (1969) (describing administrative rules as precedential, 
subject only to a “qualified role of stare decisis” (emphasis added)). For a useful 
comparison of the similarities and differences between administrative and 
judicial precedent, see Ray Jay Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to 
Administrative Decisions, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 124–28 (1957). For normative 
defenses of the difference, see id. at 128–33 (arguing that a strict version of 
stare decisis would unduly impede administrative flexibility in making policy); 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 693, 705 (2005) (same).  
 288. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Not every 
principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be 
cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. . . . In performing its important 
functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be 
equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.”). That is not to say 
that an agency may arbitrarily change course. Generally, courts require 
agencies to provide non-arbitrary explanation for an adjudicatory change in 
policy. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n 
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announced in an adjudicative order is doing the preemptive work, 
it is all the more difficult to capture this type of agency action 
under the Supremacy Clause’s rubric of “Law.”289  
If nothing else, however, limiting preemptive effect to agency 
action having the “force of law” would seem to rule out a large 
swath of nonbinding, informal agency action, including, for 
example, the type of systemic prosecutorial policies at issue in 
Arizona v. United States.290 In other administrative contexts—for 
example, the Court’s Chevron doctrine—the Court has held that 
agency manuals, guidance documents, and the like do not carry 
the force of law.291 If this conception transfers to the federalism 
                                                                                                     
agency’s unexplained departure from precedent must be overturned as arbitrary 
and capricious.”); Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 222, 
229 (3d Cir. 2003) (providing that, absent a reasoned explanation, an agency’s 
change in precedent is arbitrary and capricious). 
 289. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that the Constitution, “Laws 
made . . . in Pursuance thereof,” and treaties are the supreme law of the land). 
 290. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). In Arizona, Justice Alito—concurring and 
dissenting, in part—plainly expressed the view that the immigration agency’s 
nonbinding enforcement policies could not preempt because they did not carry 
the “force of law.” Id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). More so, he thought it “remarkable” that the administration would even 
contend otherwise. Id. (describing, as “remarkable,” the federal administration’s 
position that “a state law may be pre-empted, not because it conflicts with a 
federal statute or regulation, but because it is inconsistent with a federal 
agency’s current enforcement priorities. . . . [which] are not law.”). But the 
Arizona majority did not directly engage these points. To the contrary, it seemed 
to rely on the agency’s enforcement policies as a basis (or maybe partial basis) 
for preemption of at least one (and maybe two) of the Arizona provisions at 
issue. Id. at 2506 (majority opinion) (explaining that the state law “could be 
exercised without any input from the Federal Government (meaning the 
Executive) about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case,” thus 
“allow[ing] the State to achieve its own immigration policy”); see also Posner, 
The Imperial President, supra note 262 (observing that the Arizona majority 
found certain provisions of S.B. 1070 preempted, not because it conflicts with 
federal law, but because it “conflicts with the president’s policy”). Because the 
Court rejected the administration’s enforcement claim regarding another 
provision at issue, Section 2(B), Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510, it is hard to know 
what to make of the Court’s dichotomous treatment. Language in the Court’s 
opinion, however, suggests that the administration’s enforcement policies made 
an important difference for the preemption calculus, at least when the statute 
itself was ambiguous as to Congress’s intent. See id. (“There is a basic 
uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced.”).  
 291. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (finding that 
ruling letters have no legal force); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 
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context,292 then these types of informal agency pronouncements 
also would lack preemptive effect under a force-of-law 
approach.293 
b. For Separation of Powers 
For reasons just explained, commentators differ on where the 
line should be drawn between preemptive and non-preemptive 
agency action, in part because the line’s placement carries 
different implications for federalism(s). Still unappreciated in the 
debate, however, are how variations in the line’s placement also 
have variegated effects on separation(s) of powers. Here, I 
consider the horizontal derivatives for two related administrative 
preemption proposals. The first proposal would foreclose agencies 
from preempting state law through nonbinding administrative 
action (but would still allow agencies to preempt through 
adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking). The second 
proposal would limit administrative preemption to notice-and-
comment rulemaking (but would exclude nonbinding action, 
adjudication, and rules not promulgated pursuant to notice and 
comment from having preemptive effect).  
                                                                                                     
587 (2000) (noting interpretations, opinion letters, “policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines” carry no legal force). 
 292. Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans 
Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 
23 (2009) (describing the “force of law” as “one of the more pernicious phrases in 
American administrative law”). The confusion stems in part from the fact that 
the Court has never defined the term “force of law” and because courts employ 
the term in at least two other administrative law contexts: (1) deference 
doctrine; and (2) APA exemptions for notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Hickman, supra note 196, at 467, 472. For a discussion of these alternative and 
oft-confused uses of “force of law,” see Hickman, supra note 196, at 467, 472–90. 
 293. My own view is that if agencies are to have preemption power, then it 
should attach only if (1) Congress expressly delegates preemption authority and 
(2) the agency exercises that authority via notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
These prerequisites, taken together, afford states at least some political and 
procedural protection in Congress and some administrative protection. To be 
sure, this package falls short of the conventional political and procedural 
safeguards of federalism. But some administrative safeguarding of state 
autonomy seems better than none. 
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First, foreclosing the preemptive effect of nonbinding agency 
policies could have the effect of channeling more preemption 
decisions (1) to Congress, (2) to more formalized agency 
proceedings (such as adjudication or notice-and-comment), or 
(3) some combination of the above. More specifically, foreclosing 
nonbinding agency action from having preemptive effect would 
preserve state policies from being preempted by that policy. If the 
agency needs or wants its nonbinding policy to apply unimpeded 
and uniformly throughout the country, then the agency might 
turn to Congress for help. The separation-of-powers effects of 
channeling preemption decisions to Congress have already been 
discussed above, and will not be repeated here.294  
But what if, instead of turning to Congress to create a 
uniform standard, the agency prefers to do so through binding 
agency processes, such as notice-and-comment or adjudication?  
It is hornbook administrative law that agencies enjoy wide 
discretion in selecting their method of policymaking—whether by 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, administrative adjudication, or 
other means.295 Of course, important considerations will inform 
an agency’s choice of policymaking mode.296 First, time and 
resources are central considerations. Notice-and-comment 
proceedings tend to be the most cumbersome in light of the 
procedures outlined above (as well as others),297 which is why 
                                                                                                     
 294. See supra Parts IV(A)(1)(b) and (2)(B). 
 295. Congress can limit the range of policymaking mode by statute, but it 
usually does not do so. See RICHARD PIERCE JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 6.9, at 374 (4th ed. 2002) (“Most agency-administered statutes confer on the 
agency power to issue rules and power to adjudicate cases, leaving the agency 
with discretion to choose any combination of rulemaking and adjudication it 
prefers.”). This maxim finds its roots in SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 203 
(1947) (providing that agency has the discretion to decide whether the act by 
adjudication or rulemaking). 
 296. For a useful treatment of this point, see Magill, supra note 286, at 1396 
(“An agency’s selection of a policymaking tool [implicates] . . . . the procedure the 
agency must follow; whether and how the agency’s action binds private parties; 
whether and when the agency’s action can be challenged in court; and the 
standard that a court will apply when that suit is brought.”). 
 297. See supra notes 266–278 and accompanying text (discussing the notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures). 
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agencies sometimes prefer to avoid this policymaking device.298 
Second, the agency’s procedural choice figures prominently in 
whether, and to what extent, the substance of the agency’s policy 
will receive deference from a court on judicial review.299 Knowing 
this, agencies may choose those forms of policymaking that will 
yield higher degrees of deference.300 Third, the means chosen by 
the agency for developing policy dictate whether the resulting 
policy is binding on regulatory targets and the agency.301 
Agencies may or may not want their policies to be binding, and 
thus may select a policymaking mode based on that 
consideration.302  
My suggestion here is that “preemptive effect” might be 
added to the list of considerations that inform an agency’s choice 
of policymaking mode. If an agency wants its substantive policies 
to apply uniformly—that is, without state interference—then it 
might be more inclined to choose the policymaking mode that can 
accomplish that end. Stated otherwise, if the only way an agency 
could obtain preemptive effect administratively was through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and if an agency wants its 
substantive policy to preempt in the event of a conflict with state 
                                                                                                     
 298. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 196, at 474 (“Given the burdens of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is perhaps not surprising that agencies 
might prefer to advance substantive legal interpretations through these 
nonlegislative formats.”). 
 299. See Magill, supra note 286, at 1439 (comparing the deference each form 
of policy-making generally receives); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 237 (2001) (holding that agency action with the force of law is entitled 
to Chevron deference, and that less formal means of policymaking generally is 
not). 
 300. See Magill, supra note 286, at 1439 (noting that agencies generally 
have “discretion to choose any combination of rulemaking and adjudication it 
prefers”). 
 301. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954) 
(finding an administrative rule binding on the agency because the rule had “the 
force and effect of law”); Magill, supra note 286, at 1386 (observing that rules 
promulgated to notice-and-comment procedures are akin to statutes in that 
“they prospectively set forth a general substantive standard of conduct for a 
class of private actors”). 
 302. See Magill, supra note 286, at 1394–97 (comparing the binding effect of 
various policymaking forms).  
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law, then the agency will have a reason to proceed via notice-and-
comment rulemaking.303 Meanwhile, as the categories of 
preemptive administrative action expand—for example, to 
include adjudicative orders and nonbinding enforcement 
policies—an agency’s incentive to proceed via notice-and-
comment rulemaking may correspondingly contract.304  
Emphatically, I am not claiming that a doctrine limiting 
preemptive effect to notice-and-comment rulemaking will always 
result in agencies choosing that policymaking mode over others. 
Even if agencies were to weigh preemption as a factor, other 
considerations (such as time, resources, whether the policy is 
meant to be binding, and so on) might simply overshadow the 
preemption variable in a given case.305 Nor do I claim that 
agencies should choose notice-and-comment rulemaking for their 
garden-variety policymaking. Rather, my point is that limiting 
preemptive effect to notice-and-comment rulemakings can 
influence agency decisions to proceed by that mode on a wide 
range of substantive issues.306  
The foregoing hypothesis has implications for separation(s) of 
powers.307  
First, compared to other types of agency action, notice-and-
comment rulemaking offers the most access points for political 
                                                                                                     
 303. This proffered dynamic springs, again, from the Court’s conflict-
preemption doctrine, and is similar (but different) from what I suggested above 
in respect to the proposal that would completely foreclose administrative 
preemption. See supra notes 228–234 and accompanying text (discussing the 
proposal to eliminate administrative preemption). In that scenario, I suggested 
that Congress might be more inclined to make substantive policy decisions via 
legislation because the outlet of administrative preemption would not be 
available. Similarly, in an imagined world where administrative preemption 
was limited to notice-and-comment rulemaking, agencies may have incentive to 
make more substantive policy decisions via notice and comment.  
 304. See Magill, supra note 286, at 1402–03 (explaining that agency choice of 
policymaking is often driven by the desired outcome). 
 305. See id. at 1444–47 (noting considerations that may affect agencies’ 
policymaking choices). 
 306. Cf. id. at 1402–03 (explaining that agency choice of policymaking is 
often driven by the desired outcome). 
 307. See supra notes 279–284 and accompanying text (discussing a proposal 
to limit administrative preemption to notice and comment rulemaking). 
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and judicial oversight, which are central to functional separation-
of-powers models trained on external checks on agency action.308 
For example, whereas administrative rulemakings are generally 
subject to presidential oversight pursuant to standing executive 
orders, agency adjudications and less formal guidance documents 
are not.309 Moreover, as described above, certain notice-and-
comment rulemakings—but not other types of agency action—are 
subject to formal congressional review under the Congressional 
Review Act.310 Further, notice-and-comment rulemaking offers 
the advantage of wider public participation in the deliberative 
process, which, in turn, may increase the likelihood of “fire-
alarms” in the political branches.311 In addition, the procedural 
requirements inherent in notice-and-comment rulemaking 
provide reviewing courts the information needed to stave off 
arbitrary or capricious agency decisionmaking.312  
Notice-and-comment proceedings also implicate separation of 
power(s) models that emphasize internal administrative 
checks.313 Compared to informal adjudication and nonbinding 
agency action, notice-and-comment rulemaking tends to be more 
                                                                                                     
 308. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking 
Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 228–29 (noting that notice and comment 
rulemaking is subject to more political oversight than adjudications); see also 
supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing external-checks model of 
separation of powers). 
 309. See Stack, supra note 308, at 228–29 (noting that adjudications are 
subject to less political oversight); Executive Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 
51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (clarifying regulatory philosophy and principles). 
 310. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Congressional Review Act); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 200 (1996) (“[A]djudications 
are not appropriate candidates for congressional review.”). 
 311. See supra notes 277–278 and accompanying text (discussing “fire 
alarms” raised by dissatisfied participants). 
 312. See Sunstein, New Deal, supra note 33, at 478 (“A firm judicial hand 
has disciplined administrative outcomes by correcting parochial or ill-reasoned 
decisions and serving as a significant deterrent.”); PIERCE, supra note 295, at 
442–47 (discussing and criticizing agency duty to respond to comments). 
 313. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text (discussing model of 
internal checks-and-balances).  
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transparent and deliberative,314 which are important features of 
the internal separation-of-powers model.315  
Surely, this is not our Founders’ separation of powers. Nor, 
for that matter, is it the Founders’ version of checks and 
balances. At most, it is a reconstituted version of functional 
separated and balanced power designed to accommodate the 
operation of modern government. Still, the question remains: are 
the horizontal derivatives associated with this proposal 
desirable?  
By and large, public law scholars tend to prefer notice-and-
comment rulemaking to other types of administrative 
policymaking.316 That is in large part for the reasons outlined 
above: notice-and-comment rulemaking offers greater 
opportunities for political and judicial oversight, and tends to be 
the most transparent and deliberative method of administrative 
policymaking.317 Indeed, these virtues are thought to be 
inexorably tied: greater oversight begets greater administrative 
transparency and greater administrative deliberation;318 
                                                                                                     
 314. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 779 (1969) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that notice-and-comment rulemaking “force[s] important 
issues into full public display and in that sense makes for more responsible 
administrative action”). 
 315. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text (discussing model of 
internal checks-and-balances). 
 316. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 295, § 6.6 at 354; id., § 6.8, at 368–74 
(“Over the years, commentators, judges, and Justices have shown near 
unanimity in extolling the virtues of the rulemaking process over the process of 
making ‘rules’ through case-by-case adjudication.”). For a recent account, see 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 3, at 544 (proposing a 
presumptive requirement that agencies “use notice-and-comment rulemaking 
for implementing broad statutory requirements and interpreting ambiguous 
statutory provisions unless they offer an explanation for their choice of 
adjudication or other administrative action”). 
 317. See infra notes 318–325 and accompanying text. 
 318. See generally Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look 
Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility 
Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763 (defending the hard look doctrine); Thomas O. 
Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A 
Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997) (defending the necessity of judicial 
review); Mark B. Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent 
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 
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meanwhile, greater transparency and greater deliberation allows 
for better oversight.319 Thus, those who generally favor notice-
and-comment rulemaking might be expected to favor a doctrine 
that has the effect of funneling policymaking toward that 
mode.320  
However, not all jurists and scholars share the view that 
agency policymaking should be channeled to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.321 Some, for instance, stress the value of leaving the 
choice of policymaking mode to agencies, unencumbered by 
doctrinal nudges toward notice-and-comment procedures (or to 
any other mode).322 For some in this pro-choice camp, the problem 
is not with notice-and-comment rulemaking per se; rather, the 
problem is with its attending external control mechanisms—
enhanced judicial, presidential and congressional oversight—
which are perceived as ossifying cogs on administrative expertise, 
energy, and efficiency.323 Thus, for those concerned with the 
                                                                                                     
TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997) (same). 
 319. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private 
Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 
DUKE L.J. 377, 406–07 (2006) (discussing transparency and deliberation as 
factors that increase agency accountability); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, 
supra note 3, at 529; Kagan, supra note 61, at 2382–83. 
 320. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 319, at 384 (arguing for increased 
accountability for decisions made through “delegated regulation”). 
 321. See, e.g., Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 3, at 543–44 
(providing justifications for refusing to use notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 322. “Cost considerations aside, there are legitimate justifications [why an 
agency might choose not] to use notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Id. at 543. 
For instance, the agency might not appreciate the need for a general standard 
until the need presents itself in the course of adjudication or other 
administrative action. Id. 543–44. Or, for example, an agency might lack the 
necessary experience or expertise to decide an issue through wholesale 
rulemaking and instead might prefer to elaborate standards incrementally 
through adjudication or other means. Id. at 544; see also SEC v. Chenery, 318 
U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (suggesting that these are good reasons for allowing the 
agency to choose whether rulemaking or adjudication is preferable with respect 
to a regulatory issue).  
 323. Scholars hypothesize that agencies, fearing judicial reversal, might 
devote excessive resources to meet a reviewing court’s demands, or, worse, shy 
away from issuing particular rules. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 49 (1993) (noting that 
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heightened external controls attending notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, a federalism-inspired push toward this mode of 
policymaking may be greeted more skeptically.324  
*     *     * 
The forgoing discussion explained how reforming 
administrative preemption can have unintended but important 
bearings on separation(s) of powers in and around the 
administrative state. This cross-dimensional evaluation hopes to 
reshape the ongoing debate about what to do, if anything, about 
the Court’s approach to agency preemption. The discussion below 
makes a similar pass at the subject of “state voice” in the 
administrative forum,325 and is directed more to questions of 
institutional design than to judicial doctrine.  
B. State Voice 
The subjects of state voice and preemption partly overlap, 
insofar as state voice may affect an agency’s decision to preempt 
state law.326 However, the two subjects are not mutually 
dependent. States will want to be heard in the administrative 
forum in any number of contexts: for instance, in the many cases 
                                                                                                     
limited time and resources of agencies may discourage rulemaking); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385, 1412–13 (1992) (providing examples where the threat of judicial 
review has had a “debilitating effect” on agency rulemaking). It is not only 
judicial review that is believed to ossify notice-and-comment rulemaking; 
“presidential review” and “additional congressionally mandated procedures” also 
conspire to make rulemaking more difficult. Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking 
Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1472 (1992); see Shapiro, supra note 7, at 463, 
476–85 (arguing that the preoccupation with legitimizing agency action through 
external controls is misguided). 
 324. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 476–85 (critiquing an “outside-in” 
approach to agency accountability). 
 325. See infra notes 326–344 (discussing state voice in the administrative 
forum). 
 326. See Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127, at 2129 (arguing that 
increased state involvement in agency regulation could affect preemption 
rulemakings). 
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where agencies make policy that might overlap with state law or 
prescribe regulatory floors, but that do not expressly preempt or 
conflict with state law.327  
1. For Federalism(s) 
As discussed in Part III, whether states have or could have 
an effective voice in the administrative forum remains 
debatable.328 Many of the suggestions for preemption doctrine, 
dicussed above, speak to that concern. To complement some of 
those doctrinal proposals, however, Catherine Sharkey suggests a 
number of non-doctrinal reforms.329 For example, she suggests 
that Executive Order 13,132 be legislatively codified, judicially 
enforceable (whereas currently it is not), or both.330 Relatedly, she 
suggests a package of institutional changes designed to enhance 
agency consultation with states.331 To this end, she recommends, 
among other things, that agencies “consult with state 
representatives early in the rulemaking process,” and that state 
attorney generals “automatically be notified of proposed 
rulemakings by agencies,” so that they, in turn, can notify the 
most relevant state representatives.332 
Professor Sharkey is quite committed to the ideas that 
agencies are, and should be, key players in shaping federalism 
today.333 But, for the same reasons, she is equally committed to 
                                                                                                     
 327. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 249 (2005) (noting that some degree of federal–state 
regulatory overlap is the norm today). 
 328. See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text (discussing the 
effectiveness of state voice in the administrative forum). 
 329. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 582–90.  
 330. See id. at 530–31 (discussing the enforcement provision of Executive 
Order 13,132). 
 331. See id. at 582–90 (suggesting reforms such as expanded state 
representation, the development of agency-specific liaison groups, a provision for 
attorney general notifications, and others).  
 332. Id. at 572–73. 
 333. See Sharkey, Accountability, supra note 127, at 2128 (“[N]ow that 
Congress has taken a back seat to federal agencies on critical questions of 
preemption . . . a wise strategy would be to embrace the primacy of federal 
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the project of reforming the administrative system so that it may 
better fullfil the federalism aspirations set for it.334  
Whether Professor Sharkey’s proposals go too far, or not far 
enough, will again depend on one’s views about what federalism 
requires, and whether advancing state voice in the 
administrative arena does more to advance or upset that ideal. 
For instance, requiring agencies to solicit state views is a very 
different thing than requiring agencies to give special heed to 
state views, which, in turn, is very different than requiring 
agencies to accommodate state views, or to do so whenever 
possible. In short, state voice is not the same as state autonomy. 
But increasing the demands on agencies to solicit and respect 
state views may—for better or worse—increase state autonomy.  
2. For Separation of Powers 
Likewise, depending on one’s views, enhancing state voice in 
the administrative arena may or may not promote separation(s) 
of powers. Miriam Seifter argues, for example, that state voice 
may enhance state autonomy at the potential expense of 
administrative expertise and political accountability.335 Although 
Professor Seifter makes these claims in the context of assessing 
what state voice portends for models of administrative 
legitimacy,336 some of her insights are transferrable here.337 
                                                                                                     
agencies and to focus on reforming them to ensure they can become a rich forum 
for participation by state governmental entities.”).  
 334. See id.; see also Metzger, Agency Reform, supra note 2, at 73 (“[I]t 
makes sense to conclude that special protections for the states must develop in 
the administrative realm if federalism is to have continuing relevance in the 
world of national administrative governance that increasingly dominates 
today.”).  
 335. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 482–87, 491–96 (noting that 
increased state involvement endangers accountability and administrative 
expertise). 
 336. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 449 (“The principal project of this 
Article is to reveal and explain the tension between existing understandings of 
administrative legitimacy and special state access to the federal regulatory 
process.”). 
 337. Cf. Seidenfeld, Justification, supra note 7, at 1512 (“[T]he powers and 
 
248 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (2015) 
Administrative “expertise” is a critical feature of the model of 
internal checks-and-balances; meanwhile, “political 
accountability” is a critical element of the model of external 
checks-and-balances. I turn to these considerations below. 
a. Internal Checks-and-Balances: Agency Expertise 
Among other things, Professor Seifter warns against 
affording states too much solicitude in administrative 
decisionmaking.338 Her first concern is that agency outputs might 
unduly reflect localized political or industry preferences, both of 
which can undermine the ideal of administrative expertise.339  
Maybe so, but there is a flip side to that coin: the localized 
political or industry preferences that states funnel into 
administrative decisionmaking may align with, reflect, and/or 
advance regulatory expertise.340 With respect to that set of cases 
(however large or small), agency expertise will not be 
undermined.341  
Perhaps Professor Seifter’s claim stems from the concern 
that agencies will not know when state voice impedes rather than 
facilitates administrative expertise.342 However, why not trust 
agencies to identify and resist state sabotages on its expertise? If 
the answer is that agencies are not expert enough to know when 
their expertise is being undermined, or professional enough to 
resist it, that would seem to beg the very point in contest. States 
                                                                                                     
responsibilities of administrative agencies . . . calls into question the 
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy.”). 
 338. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 4. 
 339. Id. at 448 (contending that “states will often push political agendas that 
expertise-based legitimacy eschews”). 
 340. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 587 (noting 
that representatives from states have participated in roundtables that 
contributed to agency expertise on the topic of seatbelt installation). 
 341. Id.  
 342. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 461–63 (noting the lack of 
transparency that often attends state input into administrative 
decisionmaking).  
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might help (more than hurt) the project of keeping agencies 
expert and professional.343 
Moreover, Professor Seifter’s claim that state solicitude may 
undermine administrative expertise arguably undervalues on-
the-ground experiences that states bring to administrative 
policymaking.344 Insofar as state voice reflects particularized, 
real-world experiences, those can be important data points for 
agencies when addressing regulatory problems.345 Moreover, as 
Professor Seifter acknowledges, state-interest groups tend to 
press for the “lowest common denominator” of regulatory 
independence.346 But, insofar as the collective state voice achieves 
end of regulatory independence, individual states might exercise 
their autonomy in experimental ways.347 And that, in turn, may 
lead to better—more expert—administrative judgments in the 
future about which regulatory approaches to an issue work, 
which do not, and why.348  
                                                                                                     
 343. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 586–87 
(arguing that consultative groups, including state consultants, add to agency 
expertise). 
 344. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 491–92 (“In the abstract, state 
consultations should be a gold mine for the expertise ideal . . . . In practice, 
however, state consultation and esxpertise-based legitimacy are on a collision 
course.”). 
 345. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and 
Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 589–94 (2011) (recognizing that states can act as 
laboratories and play other significant roles in implementing federal statutes); 
Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 586–87  (stating that the 
“EPA has gained knowledge, experience, and practice cooperating with state 
authorities and being sensitive to state interests”). 
 346. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 460 (“[I]nstitutional 
concerns . . . are channeled forcefully by state interest groups, which must find 
common ground among their diverse members and often must settle for lowest 
common denominator positions.”); see also NUGENT, supra note 174, at 46–50 
(explaining that National Governors Association and National Association of 
State Legislatures most commonly seek to protect their administrative interests 
in flexibility).  
 347. See Gluck, supra note 345, at 566–68 (arguing that states can act as 
laboratories in the regulatory context). 
 348. See id. (commenting on the benefits of state experimentation).  
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In sum, enhancing state voice in administrative 
policymaking and processes might undermine agency expertise, 
for some of the reasons Professor Seifter suggests. But not 
necessasarily. Enhancing state voice in the ways suggested by 
Professor Sharkey and others might actually advance 
administrative expertise, and thus promote a key feature of the 
internal checks-and-balances model of separation of powers. 
b. External Checks-and-Balances: Political Control 
The subject of state voice also appears to cut both ways in 
respect to external checks-and-balances. As relevant here, 
Professor Seifter contends that an overly robust state role may be 
at cross-purposes with the core premises of the presidential-
control and congressional-control models of administrative 
oversight.349  
Regarding presidential control, Professor Seifter claims that 
state influence can have the “opposite effect of centralizing 
control under a nationally sensitive President.”350 That is so, she 
explains, “because states, unlike the President, necessarily 
respond to locally bounded constituencies.”351  
While that is of some concern, a functionalist might be 
content to supplement agency accountability to the President 
with the increased accountability to the public that state 
involvement affords.352 As others have shown, presidential 
accountability may help legitimize administrative governance in 
theory; but it may do little to actually keep agencies in check.353 
                                                                                                     
 349. See Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 480 (“States will often act in 
tension with the President, not merely in concert with him . . . .”). 
 350. Id. at 482. 
 351. Id. 
 352. See Keller, supra note 122, at 62 (“State power would promote 
accountability, whereas federal agencies are comprised of unelected officials 
that are almost exclusively located at the ‘distant national capital.’” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 353. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in 
Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 738 n.240 (1990) (“As regards many 
policy decisions . . . the likelihood that the President would suffer political 
reprisals if his administration made the wrong choice seems infinitesimal.”); 
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Perhaps states can help. States, after all, not only voice their 
preferences in the administrative forum; states also hear the 
preferences of agencies and of private interests.354 Thus, states 
throughout the nation can alert their local constituents—and the 
President—of objectionable agency action, inaction or intentions. 
Moreover, states can dissent to agency policy by taking opposing 
regulatory action, or by suing agency officials, which in both cases 
can force national conversations that agencies might otherwise 
prefer to avoid.355 This may not be the archetypal political 
accountability envisioned by the presidential-control model. But 
it can churn information and political awareness that can boost 
presidential accountability for agency action, and agency 
accountability to the public more generally. 
Regarding congressional oversight, Professor Seifter argues 
that a strong version of state consultation threatens the 
congressional-control model because state interests “do not 
necessarily connect to the content of congressional commands.”356 
True enough, but the same is often said of federal agencies—even 
in matters as divisive as healthcare, immigration, the 
environment, education, and beyond.357 Perhaps, then, it is best 
                                                                                                     
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (explaining how past presidents, themselves, have disclaimed having 
much control over the bureaucracy). But see Kagan, supra note 61, at 2298–99 
(arguing that the presidential-control model provides transparency about 
administrative issues and ensures responsiveness to the public). 
 354. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 530 (noting 
that procedures designed to enhance state involvement such as federalism 
impact statements will provide states with the nature of the agency’s concerns 
and its position). 
 355. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 95; Metzger, Agency Reform, 
supra note 2, at 70–71 (noting this as an important check on agency action that 
states provide, and arguing that the Court seems more receptive of state 
challenges to agency action in recent years, as reflected most prominently in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)); see also Richard E. Levy & Robert 
L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of State Remedies in Collective 
Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919, 930–35 (2009) (noting that 
states may have incentives to overregulate depending on their relationship the 
activity being regulated).   
 356. Seifter, States, supra note 116, at 498. 
 357. See, e.g., MIRANDA YAVER, WHEN DO AGENCIES HAVE AGENCY: 
BUREAUCRATIC NONCOMPLIANCE IN THE EPA 17–25 (2014) (providing an 
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for agencies and states to police each other, a result made 
possible by a strong state participatory role.358 The consultation 
between agency and state officials allows each to understand the 
other’s preferences and to alert Congress (or, for that matter, 
courts, President, and media) if the other is diverging from 
congressional commands or goals.359 
C. Cross-Dimensional Tradeoffs 
As shown above, the administrative federalism tent hosts an 
array of federalism-inspired proposals. Some ideas can work 
together and, indeed, are designed to. For instance, some 
proponents of state voice also emphasize processes for 
administrative preemption that incentivize, or require, agencies 
to consider seriously state views before making a preemption 
                                                                                                     
empirical analysis of EPA noncompliance with statutory mandates); Michael R. 
Crittenden & Colleen McCain Nelson, House Votes to Authorize Boehner to Sue 
Obama, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 30, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/hous
e-votes-to-authorize-boehner-to-sue-obama-1406760762 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015) (reporting House approval to sue President Obama for taking action 
allegedly in violation of the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Yuxin Jiang, An Unexceptional Aspect of President 
Obama’s Immigration Executive Actions, JURIST (Jan. 15, 2015, 3:00 PM) 
http://jurist.org/forum/2015/01/jill-family-executive-actions.php (last visited Feb. 
15, 2015) (noting that “[a] group of states is suing to halt the implementation of 
President Obama’s DAPA program”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Joy Resmovits, No Child Left Behind Debate Centers on Federalism, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2011, 1:02 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/08/16/no-child-left-behind-reauthorization-federalism_n_927718.html (last 
updated Mar. 9, 2012, 3:29 PM) (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (describing the 
Obama administration’s “unprecedented use of executive power to work around” 
the No Child Left Behind Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 358. See Keller, supra note 122, at 61–62 (asserting that one of the virtues of 
a federalist system is increased accountability). 
 359. See supra notes 277–278 (explaining the utility of “fire alarms” raised 
by dissatisfied participating parties); see also Metzger, Agency Reform, supra 
note 2, at 70–71 (“States may have substantial access to Congress through their 
state representatives, allowing them to raise concerns about federal agency 
actions and perhaps prompt federal oversight.”).  
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decision.360 Other proposals are not designed to work together but 
certainly can. For instance, a clear-statement rule may stand 
alone or be employed in conjunction with other requirements, 
such as notice-and-comment proceedings, heightened judicial 
scrutiny of an agency’s preemption decision, or both.361 
Meanwhile, other proposals directly compete or otherwise talk 
past each other. The proposal to eliminate administrative 
preemption, for instance, has no need for additional downstream 
limitations (such as a notice-and-comment requirement for 
preemption or special judicial-review doctrines).  
In the end, differences in opinion about what administrative 
federalism can do for federalism turn partly on empirics and 
imaginings on how the system would operate if some proposal, or 
combination of them, were adopted. Differences in opinion, 
however, also turn on which federalism(s) we hope to advance. 
Without a federalism theory to “rule them all,”362 we lack an 
objective metric for deciding which proposal is best.  
A separation-of-powers approach to administrative 
federalism fattens the constitutional goods in play. Debates over 
administrative federalism have trafficked almost exclusively in 
federalism currency. Scholars and jurists haggle over federalism 
ends—regulatory experimentation, resistance to federal 
overweening, and so on.363 And they barter with means toward 
those ends—enhancing state voice, maintaining state autonomy, 
and the like.364 Metaphorically, they trade green apples, red 
                                                                                                     
 360. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 18, at 582–84 
(arguing for increased state involvement and consultation between federal 
agencies and states). 
 361. See Rebecca Aviel, When the State Demands Disclosure, 33 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 675, 733 (2011) (“The clear statement rule might also be thought of as the 
judicial enforcement of minimal standards of notice for the consequences of 
congressional enactments.”). 
 362. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 
123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1914 (2014) (“We all have a different theory about what 
forms state power takes, but we’re in agreement that there cannot be one theory 
to rule them all.”).  
 363. See supra notes 216–227 and accompanying text (discussing federalism-
oriented goals).  
 364. See supra notes 77–99, 326–342 and accompanying text (discussing 
state voice and state autonomy).  
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apples, Fuji apples, etcetera—but it’s an apples-to-apples market. 
This Article’s cross-dimensional approach adds oranges. Although 
this complicates matters, we have complicated tastes. We want 
apples and oranges. We want federalism and separation of 
powers. For better or worse, we have plural constitutional 
commitments.  
To be sure, injecting separation-of-powers principles into the 
administrative-federalism debate will not deliver objectively 
correct solutions. Nor will it necessarily lead to greater 
consensus. However, it offers new tradeoff possibilities that, in 
turn, may lead to new compromises. Suppose, for example, that a 
decisionmaker rejects an administrative-federalism proposal 
because she disfavors the proffered tradeoff between one 
federalism good (say, state autonomy) for another (say, state 
voice). But suppose the federalism-inspired proposal also 
promotes separation of powers (say, by stimulating a 
congressional check on executive action). Now the decisionmaker 
may prefer the package. Again, I do not suggest that interposing 
separation of powers into the analysis will necessarily lead to 
consensus. Indeed, it could have the opposite effect. Still, in 
either event, the decisionmaker can take comfort in knowing the 
full terms of what is being bargained for. 
V. Conclusion 
Administrative federalism is fashionable yet fallible. 
Empirically, it remains unsettled whether federalism is advanced 
or undercut by administrative governance. Conceptually, views 
splinter on whether providing states special solicitude in the 
administrative arena even qualifies as federalism. This Article 
thickens the debate by expanding the call of the question: it asks 
not only what administrative federalism can do for federalism but 
also what it can do for separation of federal powers. 
Despite the complicating variables highlighted throughout 
this paper, the basic intuition remains the same: asking only 
what administrative federalism can do for federalism is 
potentially hazardous and at best incomplete. A federalism-
inspired proposal that does violence to separation-of-powers 
values will necessarily require an accommodation of principles. A 
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decisionmaker might choose federalism over separation of 
powers, or vice versa. This Article’s critical move, however, is to 
shine light on that choice before it is made. Intended or not, 
administrative federalism affects federalism and separation of 
powers. We should start treating it that way. 
